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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the as of yet undecided fate of thorium in Norway. The aims are to 
disclose its links to history and surroundings; shed light to the controversy enfolding it; 
divulge the true size and dimension of the topic as well as the prospects and influence of the 
most relevant actors; and attempt some degree of technological forecasting. For this purpose 
the thesis employs concepts and insights from the realm of the Large Technical Systems and 
the Technological Innovation Systems approaches. Therein the topic at hand is unveiled; hazy 
aspects and unclear roles of actors become better defined and scrutinized. The bona fide 
prospects of thorium in Norway become clearer, with obstacles and opportunities more clearly 
distinguished.  
 
Keywords: 
 
Thorium, nuclear power, history, environment, energy supply, technological systems, 
technological innovation system, public opinion, advocacy coalition  
 
 4 
Table of Contents: 
 
Abstract …..................................................................................................................................3 
Table of Contents………………………………………………………………………………4 
1. Introduction……………………………………………………………………….................7 
2. Background………………………………………………………………………………...10 
3. Methodology……………………………………………………………………………….14 
3.1. Introductory Remarks……………………………………………………………………14 
3.2. The Survey……………………………………………………………………………….14 
3.3. The Interviews……………………………………………………………………………15 
3.4. Generalizability, Reliability, Validity……………………………………………………16 
3.5. A Brief Comment on Quotations………………………………………………………...17 
4. Theoretical Framework…………………………………………………………………….18 
4.1. Large Technical Systems………………………………………………………………...18 
4.2. From Large Technical Systems to Technological Innovation Systems………………….20 
5. Analysis…………………………………………………………………………………….26 
5.1. Introductory Remarks……………………………………………………………………26 
5.2. Round One: An Attempted Large Technical System Around Nuclear Power in 
Norway………………………………………………………………………………………..26 
5.2.1. Strengths of the System-building Process……………………………………………...31 
5.2.2. Weaknesses of the System-building Process…………………………………………..33 
5.2.3. The Hiatus……………………………………………………………………………...36 
5.3. Round Two: Thorium in Norway; Assessed According to the Seven Functions Within the 
TIS Framework……………………………………………………………………………….37 
 5 
5.3.1. Function One: Entrepreneurs…………………………………………………………..37 
5.3.2. Function Two and Three: Knowledge Development (Learning) and Knowledge 
Diffusion Through Networks…………………………………………………………………39 
5.3.2.a) International Contacts………………………………………………………………..40 
5.3.2.b) Business-to-Business, and Business-to-IFE………………………………………....41 
5.3.2.c) Grass-root Link………………………………………………………………………41 
5.3.2.d) Links to Future Education Programs………………………………………………...42 
5.3.2.e) IFE and Academia……………………………………………………………………42 
5.3.2.f) The “Old” IFE and the “New” Thor Energy Bridging a Gap… ……………………..43 
5.3.2.g) Historical Link: Scandpower………………………………………………………...44 
5.3.2.h) The Hole……………………………………………………………………………..45 
5.3.2.i) General Comments…………………………………………………………………...45 
5.3.3. Function Four: Guidance of the Search………………………………………………..46 
5.3.3.a) Role of the Government……………………………………………………………...46 
5.3.3.b) Expectations………………………………………………………………………….47 
5.3.3.c) Failure to Fulfill Sky-High Expectations, and the Role of Media…………………...51 
5.3.4. Functions Five and Six: Market Formation and Resource Mobilization………………52 
5.3.4.a) Market………………………………………………………………………………..52 
5.3.4.b) Enlisting Energy Intensive Industry…………………………………………………52 
5.3.4.c) Human Capital……………………………………………………………………….53 
5.3.4.d) Financial Capital……………………………………………………………………..54 
5.3.5. Function Seven: Advocacy Coalition………………………………………………….55 
5.3.5.a) The Need and the Use………………………………………………………………..55 
 6 
5.3.5.b) History, Image and the Agenda……………………………………………………...57 
5.3.5.c) Public Opinion……………………………………………………………………….58 
5.3.5.d) Environmental Organizations………………………………………………………..59 
5.3.5.e) The Coalition………………………………………………………………………...60 
6. Concluding Remarks……………………………………………………………………….61 
Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………………..64 
Appendix One: The Interviewees….…………………………………………………………71
 7 
1. Introduction 
In 356 BC a young man set fire to the Temple of Artemis at Ephesus (today‟s western 
Turkey) and sowed the seeds of phrases like Herostratic fame and Herostratic hero. A 
beautiful marble construction the temple was one of the Seven Wonders of the Ancient 
World. Fame thus far eluded him and Herostratus‟ act was a quest for fame; a way to 
immortalize his name in history even albeit through a negative connotation. Arguments of 
those opposing nuclear power and fearing thorium‟s enchanting repute tilt in the direction of 
seeing the human race as Herostratic heroes; by allowing escalation of the nuclear power 
build-up in any way, shape or form we may secure ourselves a Herostratic status in the 
world‟s history. Those in favor have a different take on it and view it as a redeemer for 
example in terms of climate changes and energy supply. Adding to this divergence thorium 
came to Norway carrying the promise of being a profitable business adventure. The official 
Thorium Report handed in to the Norwegian government February 2008 laid dead many 
visions and dreams of imminent profit. The seeds of some ideas may still, however, find 
viable ground.  
The Thorium Report comprehensively covered aspects relating to technology and resources. 
In order to shed further light to thorium‟s opportunities and obstacles in Norway, this thesis 
will therefore approach the topic from a different angle to unveil the factors around thorium 
and their effects on its kismet. This involves a look at the Norwegian society and the history 
of nuclear power and related debates; the innovation system; and the reality of the thorium 
debate. Some things are important to bear in mind, firstly the size of the topic itself. Having 
been somewhat overblown in media it would appear to an outsider a matter of great 
dimension. Upon delving deeper into the subject matter it becomes clear that it is rather a 
corner for the especially interested. This came to affect choice of theoretical framework as 
well as perspective. Another aspect to consider is that thorium was in the debate – by some – 
provided with immunity from the traditional stigma burdening conventional nuclear power; it 
was to a large extent presented as something new and cleaner. Clarified by all interviewees 
whether for or against – thorium can and should not be assessed as an issue separate from 
nuclear power. It is a specification within the same field and this fact needs to be taken into 
account when studying the topic. Thorium must be esteemed in relation to the historical 
debate around nuclear power in Norway. The history is relevant and this promptly becomes 
obvious upon undertaking a study of the topic. It is a reference point and explanatory factor to 
most that I talked to about thorium-based nuclear power, whether in support or opposition. 
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The misgivings about nuclear power are still a pervasive force among a significant segment of 
the public; the same misgivings are thus far deeply engrained among governing persons and 
institutions; although many things have changed, some of the decisive forces are still tainted 
by the clout of the past. This all has shaped the set-up of the thesis.   
Despite persistent belief in nuclear power‟s potential by some; environmental concerns and 
fears accumulating in the wake of accidents haunted the public to the point where it became a 
sore point in the political realm. Internationally it has, on the face of things, been “politically 
incorrect” for a significant period. Lately changes have emerged on the horizon. An IEA 
reference scenario presumes – under unchanged government policies – a growth of 55% 
between 2005 and 2030 in the world‟s primary energy demand needs. Fossil fuels remain 
dominant, accounting for 84% of overall demand increase. The same reference scenario 
predicts a doubling of global electricity use between now and 2030, where fossil fuels 
continue to dominate the electricity generation fuel mix. Nuclear power provides around 16% 
of the electricity. The majority is provided by non-renewable sources.
1
 Concerns about 
security of energy supply thus accompany the recently escalating attention devoted to the 
problems of global warming and climate changes. The hard edges of nuclear power‟s decrepit 
image are gradually softening. The Thorium Report states that “no technology should be 
idolized or demonized.”2 In Norway nuclear power is nonetheless still to a large extent 
“black-and-whitened”.  
Norway stands out internationally in the context of energy use. Though at the fore when it 
comes to level of energy consumption per capita a substantial amount comes from renewable 
sources, due mainly to the availability of hydropower. The era of the large-scale water plant 
building is a thing of the past. The share that comes from renewable sources is predicted to 
decrease up to 2020 according to the Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate 
(NVE). Today increased consumption is sustained by importing electricity from neighboring 
countries, nourished by fossil energy sources and nuclear power plants.
3
 This has opened for 
arguments in favor of establishing a nuclear power plant on Norwegian soil; a thorium-based 
one as such. In the wake strong arguments can be found in support of maintaining and 
                                                          
1 Thorium Report Committee, Thorium as an Energy Source – Opportunities for Norway, 2008, page 6-8 
2 Thorium Report Committee, Thorium as an Energy Source – Opportunities for Norway, 2008, page 106 
3
 Information from: Hofstad, K., et al., Report for NVE: Kraftbalansen I Norge mot 2020, 2005  
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expanding the nuclear knowledge base so as not to lose the ability to make this choice in the 
future.  
Though much information was accumulated or verified through the reading, most is also 
anchored in the interviews conducted. Some direct quotes are presented but often I acquired 
good and often overlapping information by several interviewees as well as articles. For this 
reason I refrained from too many direct quotes; the information serves rather as a supporting 
foundation to the thesis. A small-scale survey was performed to support arguments related to 
public opinion. A best fit was selected among the options for theoretical frameworks. These 
will be outlined later along with the raison d'être; the favored choice for estimating thorium‟s 
potential – technology-specific innovation systems – was found to lack the required strength 
as a tool for historical assessment in this context. In its place for that purpose is Thomas 
Hughes‟ ideas on Large Technical Systems. The thesis will commence with a section on 
background information to provide the readers some background knowledge that will be 
helpful when reading the analysis. Next the methodology and theory will be discussed, with a 
critical look at the whole process of putting together this thesis. It was considered appropriate 
that all of these came in advance of the analysis, providing clarity of the concepts and the 
purpose ahead of the evaluation of the case. The analysis will be divided in two parts; one for 
the first theoretical approach and the historical part of the case; one for the second as well as 
the evaluation of present and future potential.     
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2. Background 
According to Trevor Pinch and Harry Collins “the personality of science is neither that of 
chivalrous knight nor that of a pitiless juggernaut. […] Science is a golem.”4 In Jewish 
mythology a golem is an animated creature made from inanimate matter - a humanoid of clay 
and water, incantations and spells. “It will follow your orders, do your work, and protect you 
from the ever threatening enemy. But it is clumsy and dangerous. Without control, a golem 
may destroy its master with its flailing vigor.”5 What more illustrative example of potentially 
incredibly good or incredibly bad science than nuclear power? Mixed feelings often follow in 
its wake. Referring to nuclear power, Hans Blix described his attitude towards it with the 
words his mother used about perfume: “It is a shame that we need it, but thank God we have 
it.”6 Erwin Chargaff – a man first a pioneer and later among the most prophetic critics of 
genetic engineering – uttered these words in 1977: “The two greatest deeds – and probably 
misdeeds – in my time has been the splitting of the atom and the discovery of a way to 
manipulate the genetic apparatus.”7 And when Otto Hahn (with Fritz Strassman and Lise 
Meitner) made the Nobel Prize-awarded discovery of nuclear fission, he reportedly 
exclaimed: “God cannot have wanted that!”8  
In an unfairly brief summary, this is the world‟s nuclear history: “The science of atomic 
radiation, atomic change and nuclear fission was developed from 1895 to 1945, much of it in 
the last six of those years.”9 Much due to the international climate of war, most of the work 
and development in the years 1939 – 45 was focused on the atomic bomb. From 1945 
onwards more attention was given to exploiting and dealing with this type of energy in a 
                                                          
4
Collins, H, Pinch, T, The Golem at Large – What You Should Know About Technology, Hand-out from TIK 
Oslo – Unsure of publisher, 1998, page 1 
5
 Collins, H, Pinch, T, The Golem at Large – What You Should Know About Technology, Hand-out from TIK 
Oslo – Unsure of publisher, 1998, page 1 
6
 Blix, Hans, Speech at ECT Conference, Bergen, April 18
th
 2008 
7
 Radkau, J, „Learning from Chernobyl fort the fight against genetics? Stages and stimuli of German protest 
movements – a comparative synopsis‟ in Bauer, M (ed.) Resistance to New Technology – Nuclear Power, 
Information Technology and Biotechnology, 1995, page 335 
8
 Radkau, J, „Learning from Chernobyl fort the fight against genetics? Stages and stimuli of German protest 
movements – a comparative synopsis‟ in Bauer, M (ed.) Resistance to New Technology – Nuclear Power, 
Information Technology and Biotechnology, 1995, page 335 
9
 World Nuclear Organisation, ‚Outline History of Nuclear Energy‟, 2005, http://www.world-
nuclear.org/info/inf54.html, 04.06.08 
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controlled fashion, for electricity production and also for naval propulsion. The main focus 
since the mid-fifties has been technological development of reliable nuclear power plants. 
“From the late 1970s to about 2002 the nuclear power industry suffered some decline and 
stagnation.”10 There were few new orders for reactors, and from the mid 1980s the number 
little more than matched retirements. In the words of Martin Bauer: “Resistance lowers the 
level of expectations of innovators. The exuberant expectations of many a project face a 
„reality test‟ on resistance, and get adjusted. A striking example is shown by the international 
projections for nuclear energy. The exuberant predictions of the 1950s and 1960s were 
massively reduced in the 1970s.”11 Output did, however, increase due to improved load 
factors and capacity.  From the mid 1980s, “the share of nuclear in world electricity […] was 
fairly constant at 16-17%.”12 This figure remains in place today.  
After a nuclear moratorium of around twenty-five years in the wake of the Three Mile Island 
and Chernobyl accidents it has resurfaced on the international arena, much due to a 
“realization of the scale of projected increased electricity demand worldwide, […] awareness 
of the importance of energy security, and […] the need to limit carbon emissions due to 
concern about global warming.”13 In Norway this interest seeped across the borders as a flash 
of thorium-induced excitement briefly illuminating the country. The most visible part of the 
flame was short-lived but embers still remain. A debate was roused in the country around 
2006 and strong arguments were put forth in a frenzied excitement that made it hard for 
ordinary people to discern what were facts and what were exaggerated utopian or dystopian 
arguments. By summer 2008 the debate has faded into the media background and is a topic 
more for those with a special interest in the field, financial, academic or otherwise. With 
nuclear power long having been a politically incorrect subject in Norway, thorium came 
without the baggage of immediate negative associations in people‟s minds. It was helped also 
by the idea of a new Norwegian “energy adventure” based on the country‟s supposedly large 
                                                          
10
 World Nuclear Organisation „Outline History of Nuclear Energy‟, 2005, http://www.world-
nuclear.org/info/inf54.html, 04.06.08 
11
 Bauer, M, „Resistance to new technology and its effects on nuclear power, information technology and 
biotechnology‟ in Bauer, M (ed.) Resistance to New Technology – Nuclear Power, Information Technology and 
Biotechnology, 1995, page 26 
12
 World Nuclear Organisation „Outline History of Nuclear Energy‟, 2005, http://www.world-
nuclear.org/info/inf54.html, 04.06.08 
13
 World Nuclear Organisation, „Outline History of Nuclear Energy‟, September 2005, http://www.world-
nuclear.org/info/inf54.html, 04.06.08 
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reserves of thorium. Thorium was discovered and named after the Norse God of Thunder, 
Thor, in 1828 by Berzelius when analyzing a new mineral found by Esmark in 
Langesundfjorden in Norway. Its radioactive nature was ascertained by Marie Curie and 
Gerhard Schmidt in 1885.     
The data on existing reserves is uncertain and varies some between different sources, due to 
limited commercial production of – and focus on – thorium. There has been little demand for 
it, and significant amounts of it can be found in storage as a byproduct from other pursuits. 
“According to US Geological Survey (2007), Norway is known to have the third to sixth 
largest thorium resources in the world. These resources, i.e. 170 000 tons, have a potential 
energy content which is about 100 times larger than all the oil extracted by Norway to date as 
well as the remaining reserves, 4 250 million m3.”14 The accessibility of this energy is, 
however, not as great as hoped according to the Thorium Report. The concentration of 
thorium in the minerals is significantly lower than in reserves found elsewhere, and this 
toughens the extraction process. Additionally, “the information on thorium resources in 
Norway is […] based on investigations carried out some 25 to 60 years ago, and no specific 
thorium exploitation has ever been carried out.”15 There was in the 1960s and 1970s 
worldwide interest in development of thorium fuel for nuclear power. The Norwegian 
Thorium Report lists three main reasons why most thorium projects were abandoned by the 
1980s – a thorium fuel cycle could not compete economically with the better known uranium 
cycle; the Chernobyl accident stifled political support for development of nuclear technology 
whether thorium or not; widespread increase of trepidation for proliferation risk linked to 
reprocessing of spent fuel.
16
 A large amount of work was carried out during thorium‟s more 
popular days of the past. It was found it could be suitable for use in practically any type of 
existing reactor. There is presently little international focus on thorium. “After India, the main 
countries driving thorium research are America and Russia with recent interest from Norway 
and Poland.”17 Some experimenting with thorium has been conducted in Germany and some 
in the UK. There have been other research projects, among them by the IAEA, Euratom and 
                                                          
14
 Thorium Report Committee, Thorium as an Energy Source – Opportunities for Norway, 2008, page 106 
15
 Thorium Report Committee, Thorium as an Energy Source – Opportunities for Norway, 2008, page 106 
16
 Information from: Thorium Report Committee, Thorium as an Energy Source – Opportunities for Norway, 
2008, page 2 
17
 Power-technology.com (The website for the power industry), „Thorium: Cleaner Nuclear Power?‟, August 
2007, http://www.power-technology.com/features/feature1141/, 04.06.08 
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notably by CERN. Some have faith in the possibility of the MYRRHA-project (Multi-purpose 
hYbrid Research Reactor for High-tech Applications) in Belgium hosting a realistic further 
development of this line of research. The joint-effort Generation IV project looks at various 
reactor types as future-best alternatives. “Currently thorium is not a prioritized topic in GIF 
[The Generation IV International Forum].”18    
                                                          
18
 Thorium Report Committee, Thorium as an Energy Source – Opportunities for Norway, 2008, page 2 
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3. Methodology 
3.1. Introductory Remarks 
The aim of this thesis is to identify the realm of thorium in the Norwegian context, and to 
clarify its potential and parameter according to technological innovation system functions 
and the establishment of large technological systems/subsystems.  
The method of choice is a case study, with the depth and the freedom of set-up that permits 
the research process. The expansive nature of a case study, as outlined and exemplified 
through Colin Robson‟s and Steinar Kvale‟s works listed in the bibliography, renders it 
suitable both for generating and testing hypotheses. In the case of thorium I chose not to 
formulate a hypothesis as such but rather a goal, stated in italics above. The information base 
is largely collected through interviews with relevant persons, supported by readings and a 
small-scale survey. Early on I contacted Statkraft about being part of their exploratory project 
on thorium and was given relatively free reign and would present my finished thesis to them. 
Thorium is virtually a non-market commodity. Despite links to the past, there is no previous 
system around thorium to evaluate or compare with. The closest relevant comparison is the 
process and build-up around nuclear power in Norway when it was last seriously debated. The 
approach of this thesis will not allow me to establish with certainty the final fate of thorium in 
Norway. It can, however, achieve the goal – dissecting the issue and exposing the truer 
picture hiding behind the muddled public debate cluttered with disarray of opposing 
arguments. It can also provide a fair inkling of what direction future developments might take 
as well as pinpoint areas where further study is required.  
3.2. The survey 
The survey would test the waters for public opinion. Fifty participants were enrolled to 
answer the same set of questions; some were approached “on the street”; some questionnaire 
forms were distributed by acquaintances in other towns or milieus. A good age spread was 
acquired (17-76), and a good balance of male/female participants and people from different 
professions and political camps. The filling in of political orientation was optional due to the 
fact that many people are reluctant to reveal this when in direct contact with the person behind 
the survey. It was left blank by some but the majority filled it in. I am well aware that this is a 
small survey in statistical terms, and have not attempted to claim it can represent public 
opinion in Norway at large. For a qualitative case study I nonetheless considered it to be 
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useful and it gives an indication of what challenges may lay ahead before public acceptance 
can be confirmed. Some participants felt it necessary to add comments to two of the questions 
and in hindsight I can see that additional liberty of choice in responses could have been 
provided here. A more in-depth study of this particular aspect would also require a wider 
survey.  
3.3. The interviews – process and participants 
In addition to the survey among a more random selection of participants came the in-depth 
interviews with people knowledgeable and/or opinionated on the topic at hand. I constructed 
an interview guide that was purposefully left a bit loose, so that conversations could run as 
unconstrained as possible. There was a set of core questions, but in some cases questions were 
added related to individual areas of expertise; in a few the range of questions was shortened 
when only specific information was needed from the interviewee. All affected persons were 
contacted for approval when bringing direct quotes into the text. For lengthy interviews a tape 
recorder was employed for accuracy purposes. Although more time-consuming, most 
interviews were conducted in person to encourage a personal and relaxed tone. In a couple of 
cases due to distance or time-shortage interviews were conducted over the phone.  
Participants were enrolled from the academic and commercial world, as well as the political 
and the idealistic sphere. For the purpose of a balanced representation, I made sure to include 
voices both of the pro and con side. The number of people with knowledge, opinions and 
involvement related to thorium in Norway is still small enough that it was possible to quickly 
gain an overview of the relevant persons. The creation of a potential thorium industry, or even 
a thorium knowledge base of a significant size, is still at infant level. The “thorium faction” is 
therefore a group marked by a high degree of cooperation and a reasonably free flow of 
information. For this reason I have not opted for total anonymity for my interviewees and 
none have requested it. On my own initiative I have still chosen a certain degree of discretion 
with respect to some aspects, and where interviewees have indicated that the information is 
more sensitive. I have left out the name of the source in some cases as I do not wish to reveal 
any information that might be considered “incriminating” or in any way awkward for the 
participants.  
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3.4. Generalizability, reliability and validity 
Traditionally “these terms [generalizability, reliability, validity] were used by scientists to 
disqualify the qualitative research”19 under the assumption that it was too strongly founded on 
subjective interpretations. Steinar Kvale highlights the richness and scope of the qualitative 
research interview in social sciences research, and encourages an alternative approach to the 
named terms. 
Generalizability – can the claim be made general? By following the example of the courtroom 
argument-based form of assertive logic and making the evidence and arguments explicit the 
scientist leaves it up to the reader(s) to judge the authenticity of any generalization. I have 
aimed not to prove/disprove a rigid hypothesis in this thesis but rather pull the veil on a full 
picture. I have thus incorporated the acceptance of my own built-in and unavoidable 
subjectivity and left it up to the reader to pass a final judgment after reading my arguments.  
Reliability – is there consistency in process and research findings? Through a presentation of 
background information followed by full disclosure of the working process I divulged as 
many sides as possible. Acknowledging that there is unintentional subjectivity integrated in 
my design of the research process/questions, I took precautions to limit preconceptions from 
seeping into the work. Kvale points to an advantageous balance between avoiding stringency 
so as not to stifle creative thinking and variation, and a strict procedure to avoid subjectivity. 
What I believed to be the best way was avoiding lead questions and providing scope for 
spontaneity in interviews; word by word transcripts of interviews; and double-checking direct 
quotes. Coupled with openness this grants the reader the freedom of own interpretations and 
enhances reliability.    
Validity – to what extent do observations reflect the phenomena intended to be measured or 
unveiled?
20
 Kvale recommends that validation be understood not as end inspection but rather 
as an unremitting process of quality control guiding the work from start to finish. Moreover, it 
is suggested that validation entails the ability to be self-questioning and cross-check and 
control one‟s own work through critical eyes and thus elude a selective and skewed 
interpretation and perspective of the topic. Throughout the process and the information I came 
across doors to new perspectives were opened, others closed; individuals spurred new ideas; 
                                                          
19
 Kvale, S, Det Kvalitative Forskningsintervju, 2006, page 159 
20
 From Kvale, S, Det Kvalitative Forskningsintervju, 2006, page 166  
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the analysis profited from adjustments in the focus of the theoretical framework. Staying true 
to the core of my original idea I nonetheless remained open to some reformulations and 
adaptations.  
3.5. A brief comment on quotations 
I have used sources – spoken and written – both in English and Norwegian. In some cases I 
have rephrased arguments in Norwegian into my own words in English; in other cases it felt 
more appropriate to credit the full direct quote to the source. These cases presented the barrier 
of language differences. I have chosen, to the best of my ability, to translate these quotes as 
accurately as possible. It is not always possible with a wordy-by-word literal translation. I 
have made sure to maintain the sentiment of each sentence in every case, and stuck to literal 
translations where possible. Apologies for any discrepancies – these occur mainly in places 
where direct translations for particular words are non-existent.  
 18 
4. Theoretical framework 
To establish the utmost potential of an invention/innovation, placing it in a theoretical 
framework helps contextualize and clarify further aspects of it. Two angles of approach have 
been singled out – one from the realm of STS studies and one from innovation studies. I 
acknowledge that these two strands are not as separate as it may sound through my 
formulation, and that despite the fact that we focused on them in different modules, they are 
interlinked and overlapping. The reason I separate them is due to how I encountered them. It 
is also to draw them together by singling out their different strengths; to show their overlap in 
the meaning behind terminology and turn of phrase; and added together depict the best of both 
“worlds”. I found that my theory choices complemented each other, fashioning a 
comprehensive picture.  
One covers – in this thesis – the historical backdrop to the case; one covers the evaluation of 
its present situation and a forecasting of potential. From STS the focus will be on Large 
Technological Systems (LTS, and often interchangeably referred to as Large Technical 
System in the literature). From innovation studies the focus will be on Technological 
Innovation Systems (TIS). Though not specified only for this use by Hughes, he employs his 
LTS approach to explain past occurrences. Moreover I found no identifiable tool for 
forecasting bar, to some extent, momentum. Nuclear power in Norway does not have 
momentum at this stage. One can discuss whether it could have developed in the past or is 
likely to be in the future. Having seen seeds of nuclear power‟s momentum in Norway but 
never fully unleashed, the aspect of momentum is not a main focus in this thesis. It is not a 
forgotten aspect; in relation to this topic, however, it would serve a purpose of theoretical 
interest rather than a practical one. It is a significant part of Hughes‟ LTS theory and thus the 
closest to a weakness concerning choice of theory, considering it is not as generously 
endowed with attention. The benefits of LTS regarding demarcation of the subject area as 
well as identifying factors of Norway‟s nuclear history made it a tempting and also a decent 
choice nonetheless. Important LTS concepts overlap and complement those of TIS. TIS is, 
however, not as weighty in a historical context as LTS, leaving space for the latter.  
4.1. Large Technical Systems 
Thomas Hughes wrote in 1987 the Evolution of Large Technological Systems. The study of 
LTS, very popular in the 1990s, is a sub-discipline of the History of Science and Technology. 
The LTS approach incorporates the social shaping aspect, which is a helpful explanatory 
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factor as to why systems materialize or fail to do so. It hums in tune with the SCOT (Social 
Construction of Technology) model advanced by Bijker and Pinch. It is thus a good historical 
instrument for pinpointing why and how things are or were and identifying their route. The 
case of thorium comes with a past and with a fate to be decided in the future. As a form of 
nuclear power it belongs in the context of the creation of a technical system around nuclear 
power. The LTS approach can thus trace the history of this system building process up to 
thorium‟s entry, where the TIS approach will take over to ascertain “the now” and to look 
ahead. By presenting the image of a system Hughes overrides the separation of micro and 
macro, and these can be linked together in analysis in a way that encompasses social, 
technological, financial and political elements relating to a technology. Accepting that they 
are interrelated and affect each other, a comprehensive analysis including everything from 
natural resources and physical artefacts to institutions, organizations and legislation, firms and 
official authorities, can be performed. The system components are both socially shaped and 
society-shaping. They are organized around the common goal of developing and advancing a 
technology – a sentiment mirrored and refined in the Innovation System (IS) approach to be 
discussed later in this section. Hughes claims LTSs appear to follow a discernable albeit 
loosely defined pattern. He describes seven phases of progress: invention, development, 
innovation, transfer, growth, competition and consolidation. “The phases in the history of a 
technological system are not simply sequential; they overlap and backtrack.”21 They appear 
not necessarily in that order, but “a pattern is discernible because of one or several of these 
activities predominating during the sequence of phases suggested.”22 Inventions can be 
divided into conservative or radical – the first pertaining to those improving or expanding 
existing systems and occurring predominantly during the phases of competition and growth, 
the latter pertaining to those occurring during the invention phase inaugurating a new system.  
A fully developed LTS around nuclear power is found neither in the past nor in the present in 
Norway. The attempts and processes involved in building one can, however, be discerned. 
Like an unbaked cake – one can perceive the components, the ingredients, but the ready-to-
serve result was and is not achieved. LTS is a good framework to have as a basis and to 
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demarcate the realm of the case; what it is and is not. In Hughes‟s description they are of 
mammoth proportions and complexity – his example of choice is the electric light and power 
system. Nuclear power and thorium are not large enough in Norway to constitute an LTS 
alone. “In a large technological system there are countless opportunities for isolating 
subsystems and calling them systems for purposes of comprehensibility and analysis.”23 
Nuclear power can rather be placed in the context of LTS as a subsystem of the Norwegian 
energy system. A few handy concepts are introduced by Hughes: system builder (also referred 
to as entrepreneur), feedback-loop, reverse salient, technological style, and momentum 
(likened to trajectory by Hughes). System-builder being fairly self-explanatory refers to the 
individual(s) acting as a driving force in creating the system. Feedback-loops go between the 
development of the system components and the surroundings. Technological style aptly 
covers the attributes of thorium.  As Hughes points out, style ties in with the social 
construction of technology. The style needs to be appropriate for the specific time and place. 
In Norway nuclear power for commercial use has so far been a failed innovation, as it never 
made it to market here. The reasons for this will be examined in the analysis section. When 
looking at thorium today it can be seen as a continuation of the process of bringing the nuclear 
power subsystem onto the market and into the energy system in Norway. It is as such a 
conservative invention, springing from and building on conventional nuclear power. Seen in 
this light thorium is the technological style nuclear power might come to take on in Norway. 
Reverse salient is a term Hughes has borrowed from military historians, referring to an 
outcropping in a geometrical figure, battle line or weather front. While a system grows and 
expands, reverse salients are likely to develop. They are components that have fallen behind 
or out of pace with others in the system, and are then out of phase. These will be traced in the 
analysis with respect to the “first round” of system-building around nuclear power in Norway; 
and a comparison can be made to see if these are/can be overcome in relation to the present 
thorium-case.  
4.2. From Large Technical Systems to Technological Innovation Systems 
Early in the process it became clear that LTS alone would not be adequate to examine 
thorium‟s potential market-entry and the following success/failure of a system around it. It 
does provide a good framework, names for concepts and explanatory devices. It here works 
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best as a historian‟s or sociologist‟s tool; helpful when seeking to establish an understanding 
of – and giving a name to - past events and their reasons and explaining the path to the present 
situation. When supplemented by ideas from innovation studies a fuller picture of the topic at 
hand can be provided. Thorium and nuclear power in Norway have both a history and an 
unanswered future. Having now “labeled” and “categorized” thorium up to this point, some 
tools for investigating the likelihood of it playing a significant role in the future are required. 
One phrase from Hughes‟ article on LTS indicates the existence of what has by others been 
termed Innovation System (IS). Technological systems “are presided over by, systematically 
linked to, and financially supported by larger entities [my italics].”24 He goes on to observe 
that since radical inventions do not contribute to growth of existing systems a large portion of 
the surroundings do not nurture radical inventions. This corresponds well to recent IS 
research.  
The IS approach sometimes overlaps, and complements, that of LTS, but the technological 
forecasting element is more specifically discussed and incorporated here. The use of the 
system metaphor has the same effect as for LTS research; it augments comprehensiveness.  
In literature different kinds of ISs are described depending on the focus of the analysis; mostly 
divided into National (NIS), Regional (RIS) and Sectoral (SIS). Newest is Technological 
Innovation System (TIS), frequently the favored choice for research papers on renewable 
energy and alternative energy technologies. A weakness or dilemma of the choice of theory is 
here that placing thorium in this context is not an undisputable move. Thorium-based nuclear 
power is strictly speaking not renewable although some term it as such. However, it can 
neither be grouped as a GHG emitting energy form and is thus “clean” under that heading. It 
could also justifiably be placed in the “alternative energy” section. It is not specified that the 
theoretical approach cannot be applied to nuclear power. Nevertheless, I do accept and 
understand that it could be a point of contention. Reasons for choosing the TIS approach are 
that the size of the technological systems outlined is suitable for this case. Terms and concepts 
– some in name, others in meaning – overlap or are compatible with LTS.  
 
The TIS concept focuses just on the institutions, actors and networks directly influencing 
development and diffusion of one specific technology. It is thus useful when identifying 
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“characteristics of the specific system associated with an emerging technology, its strengths 
and weaknesses.”25 This is therefore a helpful delineation in the context of thorium, as the 
focus is to identify the specifics and characteristics of a system around emerging technologies 
and their potential. Since the introduction of these concepts by Carlsson and Stankiewicz they 
have been developed into a method for gaining an understanding of system dynamics. In the 
words of Hekkert, “there is a TIS for all technologies and […] each TIS is unique in its ability 
to develop and diffuse a new technology […].”26 He claims that in the early stages of a TIS 
the number of actors, networks and institutions is small. This limits the assimilated 
complexity and allows for a mapping of the dynamics of a budding thorium-centered TIS.  
 
Grasping the dynamics of the system can be done through identification of key activities 
taking place within the TIS; and these influence the development, diffusion and use of an 
innovation. A chain of positive feedback-loops between various components and activities 
within the TIS has been discerned by recent scholarly insights as criteria for the success of an 
innovation. The interactions might constitute a circular process, and lead to the construction 
of an accompanying TIS. These processes have in recent years been studied through the key 
activities, often labeled functions of the IS.
27
 I have chosen to use an apposite set of seven 
functions, the list of which to a large degree was developed in consensus between colleagues 
of Chalmers University in Sweden and the University of Utrecht for the purpose of 
application to empirical work and recently utilized for example by Negro, Hekkert et al. in 
“Stimulation Renewable Energy Technologies by Innovation Policy”. 
 
The TIS approach can be justified as a much more effective tool to study smaller industries 
and branches of technology and their potential, than for example the larger NIS. A 
technology-specific innovation system corresponds in size and principle to a subsystem of an 
LTS as to which thorium was previously defined a part. Looking at the emergence of a TIS 
around thorium and its future potential, these are the seven functions that will be studied:  
                                                          
25
 Negro, S. O., Hekkert, M. P. et al., Stimulation Renewable Energy Technologies by Innovation Policy; ISU 
Working Paper # 08.13, page 6 
26
 Negro, S. O., Hekkert, M. P. et al., Stimulation Renewable Energy Technologies by Innovation Policy; ISU 
Working Paper # 08.13, page 6 
27
 From Negro, S. O., Hekkert, M. P. et al., Stimulation Renewable Energy Technologies by Innovation Policy; 
ISU Working Paper # 08.13, page 4 
 23 
Entrepreneurs; knowledge development; knowledge diffusion; guidance of the search 
(expectations, visions, policy goals, demands, selection); market formation (niche 
markets, feed-in tariffs); resource mobilization; advocacy coalition (Creation of 
legitimacy / counteract resistance of change).  
Innovation is both an individual and collective act. As pointed out by Mark Hekkert in a 
presentation at the May 23 2008 Policy Seminar at the Norwegian Research Council: 
Determinants of technological choice are not only found in individual firms [such as Thor 
Energy in the Norwegian case of thorium] but also reside in the wider system. In Norway as 
abroad there are vast-reaching vested interests in the fossil fuels based industry and related 
technology. Innovation processes is “characterized by uncertainties, high risks, huge 
investments and late returns on [these].”28 Kleinschmidt et al point out that often governments 
must therefore interfere to bring about change. It is an important but difficult task as “most 
innovation policies are well suited when it comes to supporting existing technological 
systems, but much less when it comes to stimulating new ones.”29 Hekkert presents some 
impasses of the resulting lock-in that Norway and many other countries experience. Markets 
and consumers are familiar with these; there are cheap and well-functioning technologies 
involved; search heuristics are based on these technologies; there are specific educational 
programs related to these technologies – thus the inertia causing the carbon lock-in has been 
permitted to arise and subside. Alternative technologies, on the other hand, are at the time of 
their arrival crude and inefficient in comparison; sometimes badly adapted to the uses to 
which they will ultimately be put. Development and adaptation to surroundings are necessary 
in order to survive the transition to innovation. In order to avoid a continuing lock-in, stress 
must be put on the existing system through incentives for alternatives and a well-functioning 
system must be created around the new technology (-ies). Relevant policy changes and 
measures must be made now to have a prompt enough effect on the energy system and our 
environment, as there is a time lag involved in big changes. This also entails patience beyond 
today‟s trends of aspirations for instant gratification. As Bergek and Jacobsson note, “a 
transformation of the energy sector post 2020 rests on a range of policy initiatives taken 
today, and as early as several decades ago. Policy-making must therefore be conducted with 
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very long-term perspective.”30 TIS growth is connected to fulfillment of the seven functions 
and a constructive interaction between these as positive or negative feedback-loops. It is a 
new approach to analysis of technological change and to the precarious domain of 
technological forecasting.
31
  
The dimension of time is interesting in the building of a system. There is no time-limit as to 
how long it should take for a system to mature adequately; it depends on all interrelated 
factors and the environment harboring it. With integrated feedback-mechanisms, the 
configuration of components, attributes and affiliations is constantly changing within the 
system. “A snapshot of the system at a particular point in time may differ substantially from 
another snapshot of the same system at a different time.”32 In this case it is more apt to speak 
of a snapshot of the creation-process of systems; the recipes rather than the finished cakes. 
With reference to all of the information above, a well-defined place can be found for 
thorium‟s case. In LTS idiom thorium-based nuclear power can be positioned as a potential 
subsystem of the Norwegian energy system; which is presently largely oil and gas based 
regarding export and hydropower based for home use. Nuclear power‟s historical triumphs 
and failures and their causes will be established, as the thorium case is here viewed as the 
continuation of the process of building system around nuclear power in Norway and an 
answer to the question of technological style. The subsystem is considered to correspond to a 
TIS, and the build-up of a TIS around thorium will be analyzed; its potential and future role 
assessed in keeping with the cited seven functions. Though the activities around nuclear 
power decades ago and the recent interest in thorium are viewed as two parts of one and the 
same process they will for analysis purposes be esteemed as two individual processes 
(alternatively viewed as two snapshots of one system-building process at different times). I 
regard this to be sound as well as practical, due to the fact that there was a “hibernation 
period” between the two. This approach is in tune with the idea that a snapshot of a system 
and its circumstances at two different points in time differ significantly, in this case to the 
point where a comparison is apt when capturing the strengths, weaknesses and prospects of 
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success. As Hekkert points out, when applying the seven functions in analysis of a case it is 
helpful to compare two systems.  The focus will for the most part be on the case of this thesis 
– thorium – but where appropriate comparisons will be made. 
 26 
5. ANALYSIS 
5.1. Introductory remarks 
As a comment to procedure: I approach the first and second “rounds” of nuclear debates for 
comparison/analysis purposes as two separate systems in order to fully capture the picture of 
thorium‟s potential. I view them, however, as two rounds in the creation of one system around 
nuclear power over time. The question is what form it will take and what time or 
circumstances will allow the system existence, if ever. When considered as two separate 
entities, one is historical and one is future. Following the reasoning in the theory section it is 
thus appropriate to apply concepts of LTS to the former and TIS to the latter. If the usage and 
overlap of these two theoretical approaches seems muddled or unclear, it is done so because 
the case of Norway is special and this technological system and its creation process will have 
a past and a future and both conceptual frameworks are thus required angles. The theoretical 
approach posits novelty of the technology chosen for study. Thorium is not a new idea, 
nuclear technology is not new. They are, however, new on a commercial level in Norway. 
They are also new in the context of the energy system. Thorium is further a new face of 
nuclear power on the Norwegian negotiation table. There are also, for sake of argument, new 
and improved technologies existing and being developed both around conventional nuclear 
power and around thorium. The focus of this thesis is on the present-day issue of thorium. 
More space and attention will therefore be granted the TIS analysis of thorium. The historical 
backdrop presented in an LTS perspective will hence be unfairly short. It serves here as a 
supporting aspect to the case at hand; an analysis of it for its own sake would of course entail 
greater depth and detail than can be provided here.  
5.2. Round one: An attempted LTS around nuclear power in Norway 
“From the end of the sixties there were in particular three great society-industrial projects 
capturing the interest of the Labor Party-state‟s national strategists. The first was the focus on 
Norwegian nuclear power; it was blocked by public opinion. The second was the 
establishment of a Norwegian electronics industry; it ended in wreckage. The third was the 
creation of a state-owned Norwegian oil company; it was a success.”33 After Norway‟s oil 
discovery the OPEC-shock sent oil prices through the roof – contributing to international 
crisis but a golden opportunity for Norway. As Sejersted notes, “Sometimes it seems 
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Norway‟s success in the economic area seems to be based more on luck than skill.”34 Looking 
back at Norway‟s failed nuclear project it is thus interesting to go back to the origins and trace 
the strengths and weaknesses of the system-building process to evaluate whether there was a 
lack of skill, will or favorable circumstances that lead to its malfunctioning. Following the 
end of WWII the world witnessed an intensification of the work towards peaceful exploitation 
of the potential that lay in atomic energy, and Norway was one of the forerunners in research 
to locate civil uses for atomic energy.  
The invention of this source of immense energy had been put to use and shown its potential 
for devastation. Norwegian Minister of Defense in the after-war years, Jens Chr. Hauge 
brought into the Labor Party new ideological ideas; focus on military defense combined with 
great technological optimism. Rune Slagstad names the efforts “Hauge‟s modernizing 
strategy”, and this involved between thirty and forty research engineer returnees from 
experiences in British war research. These were more than willing to service in building the 
country‟s future. Hauge‟s technological optimism spanned more fields than one, his interests 
were markedly military oriented a while, and nuclear energy was thus one of several 
directions to pursue. His role was necessary in the system-build up. It does, however, not 
qualify for the title of “system-builder”. This fits Gunnar Randers, a central figure in the 
atomic energy discipline.  
Initially defense purposes were not ruled out by those behind the “nuclear project” in Norway; 
a combination of the civil and military uses was seen as fruitful.
35
 To begin with the 
development – or negotiation – phase had several possible areas of use for atomic energy: 
nuclear bomb, fuel in vehicles, ships, planes, rockets and tanks and as radioactive combat 
gases. The Upper Defense Command‟s technical committee and the heads of research at 
Forsvarets Forskningsinstitutt (FFI, Defense Research Institute) concluded that Norway did 
not have the required scientific, technical and financial preconditions for production of 
nuclear weapons, and had doubts regarding enhanced security in a crisis situation with 
Norwegian nuclear bombs. Ideas on use of nuclear power in vehicles and the like were 
abandoned due to radiation danger. At the turn of 1946-47 “military purposes were toned 
down, though not removed.”36 The development phase in Norway came as such to revolve 
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around a build-up leading first to the two reactors, then in direction of civil commercial 
energy production. 
Jens Chr. Hauge and Gunnar Randers were not the only people speaking up for the cause of 
technology. The establishment of Norway‟s Technical-Scientific Research Council (NTNF) in 
1946 was accompanied by a Parliamentary bill highlighting the technological development as 
a necessity. The Zeitgeist was one of technological confidence and buoyancy. Regarding 
nuclear energy, the media helped the cause by devoting attention to it. Newspapers brought 
sympathetic reports whenever something happened on the nuclear front.
37
 The advancement 
of applied atomic energy research was facilitated by collaboration between Randers and 
Hauge, the first through his connection to both the international and national scientific milieu 
and the latter through his will to take advantage of the political power bestowed upon him. 
Together with “self-made” engineer Odd Dahl, they were a zealous and dynamic threesome 
fitting discernable roles as “theoretician, the practical go-getter, and political executor.”38 
In 1947 an endowment of five million kroner for the construction of a reactor was uniformly 
and without debate conceded in Parliament. Hauge had secured the support of the necessary 
persons like Alf Ihlen, president of NTNF. The proposition was then penned by the zealous 
Gunnar Randers and political accomplice Hauge. The intentions were that this reactor would 
be of use as a neutron source, and be a tool for studying chain reactions. It would be a 
research reactor. More concrete objectives, like the value it would have in the production of 
radioactive isotopes for use in medicine and biology, were – interestingly enough – not 
mentioned at the time. Illustrative of the Zeitgeist is the fact that alongside the five-million 
endowment one of equal size was granted the development of rockets at FFI. This was the 
new attitude to both technology and defense.
39
 FFI and IFA (Institute for Atomic energy) 
received far higher amounts than academic research institutions could expect.  
The heavy-weight institutions both in terms of endowments and staffing until the mid-sixties 
were FFI and IFA, and they were the most radical technologically. Their research was 
directed mainly at gaining insights in new areas, rather than the more modest aims of the 
industry for higher efficiency and enhanced productivity. Institutions focusing on the latter 
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received far less during this period.
40
 The time was shaped and colored by a technical “elite” 
with the right connections, and by an optimism bordering utopianism for what technology 
could achieve in the future. February 25, 1957, the company Noratom was founded at a 
meeting at Norwegian Industrial Association and was greeted with great interest. High-
ranking representatives from a large number of groups from the industry as well as minister of 
industry G. Sjaastad and Crown Prince Olav attended. Industrial giant Norsk Hydro was 
among the founders, and had always had an interest in the nuclear industry due largely to its 
heavy-water production. Intentions of those behind the Noratom project were to “get 
Norwegian industry the ticket to the technological society and markets of the future, by taking 
advantage of IFA and other institutes‟ results in all fields technical.”41 With the establishment 
of Noratom Randers and Hauge hoped to realize their entrenched dream of a high-tech 
modernizing of Norway with the help of nuclear power.
42
 
It would remain a dream; they were as such let down both by market and public opinion. In 
the “building-up and waiting”-period – or early innovation phase – here was a debate around 
the role of the atoms in Norwegian technology-politics, gaining more partakers from the end 
of 1950s. For real, “criticism started in Teknisk Ukeblad [Technical Weekly], and spread to a 
wider part of the population in the 1960s.”43 There was from the start skepticism to the 
“nuclear project” from the realm of academia, rooted in concern for basic research and 
suspicions turned real of potential funding finding the way there rather than to universities. 
And they wished for a more objective and impartial handling of atomic energy matters by 
authorities.
44
 The building of the first reactor was first placed under the FFI, but it was after 
opposition from universities that nuclear activities were reorganized as a civil institute – IFA 
(half state-owned, half owned by Hydro) – in 1948.  
Astrid Forland places significance of the failed Norwegian efforts on changes in American 
nuclear policy during the 1950s. While “the American policy of monopoly had made reactor 
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technology hard to access,”45 Norwegian nuclear expertise had come in demand. Norway, 
however, did not have the resources to compete when the US abolished the restrictive course 
regarding export of nuclear technology.  In the case that one can speak of a transfer-period 
being reached, it seems most appropriate to speak of transfer out of Norway due to the 
keenness to share information and knowledge, and cooperative projects. But as civil nuclear 
power materialized in other countries, Norway was left in the limbo. Visions faced a harsh 
reality test for Noratom and triumphs were few and far between. For example in 1960, where 
twenty-two tenders were placed on behalf of Norwegian industry, only one resulted in an 
order.
46
 The company developed into something of a “nuclear provisions store” delivering a 
number of nuclear instruments for industrial use, radiation measurement equipment and 
others. Throughout the 1960s the breeder reactor and graphite moderated gas-cooled reactor 
became dominating concepts and Norway found itself practically alone with the boiling water 
reactor (BWR) and could no longer sail on the wave of early mover advantages. Additionally, 
“[segments of the] industry and the authorities changed their opinion on the focus on nuclear 
power from the end of the 1950s to the middle of the 1960s.”47 When, by the mid-sixties, 
nuclear power technology had reached a level of maturity allowing reactors to produce 
electric power in a profitable manner Norway had trouble keeping up. A home market had not 
yet successfully been created and markets abroad were not acquiescent with visions.  
An unsatisfactory cost-benefit appraisal, combined with a generous blessing of large amounts 
of natural resources and a changing society became the reverse salient in the Norwegian 
system build-up around nuclear power. Norsk Hydro had taken on a leading role in the 
Norwegian nuclear efforts, was share-holder in IFA, behind Noratom, one of the initiators in 
building a nuclear power plant and had interests in Scandpower, originally set up at the urging 
of then Norwegian Minister of Industry, Finn Lied, with the objective of being an engineering 
company targeting the growing nuclear power and petroleum industries. Odd Viggo Nilsen 
claims economic reasons are likely to be the cause Hydro‟s backing out, as obstacles delaying 
or preventing nuclear power from becoming a thriving industry were unveiled with the 
passing of time. By the sixties “[Norway] had become more bureaucratized.”48 The passing of 
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an endowment as large as that of 1947 without debate in Parliament was unimaginable by 
now. A new group had risen to a more dominating position in industrial politics throughout 
the post-war years. These were not technology optimists to the same degree and favored the 
efforts being put into exploitation of “natural advantages such as energy intensive industry 
linked to hydropower and natural resource production (like the oil recently found).”49  
The 1970s saw the break from the “industrial project of modernization”50. A new focus, 
linked to the trio growth, energy and environment, emerged. The book Limits to Growth was 
published by the so-called Club of Rome in 1972, among whose authors we find Jørgen 
Randers – son of Gunner Randers. The cause of the environment, and protection of it, would 
have a significant bearing on the political agenda during the course of the seventies. With 
former adherents like Norsk Hydro and protégé company Scandpower, as well as political 
focus, lost from the cause of nuclear to that of oil; vast natural endowments of hydropower 
and oil; and the more inhospitable atmosphere caused by the environmental movement and 
altered signals from the surroundings, the nuclear cause suffered defeat. It has in fact been 
asserted that by end of the 1960s, “Norway had a „nuclear power structure‟, and all that was 
missing were the power plants.”51 In 1970 the government presented a bill suggesting focus 
on nuclear power and in 1972 Parliament passed a law presupposing stipulating construction 
of four nuclear power plants by 1986. Then in 1973 protests exploded in Norway. Later the 
Three Mile Island accident sealed the coffin of nuclear power in Norway for the time being.  
5.2.1. Strengths of the system-building process 
If looking at the fulfillment of business/market potential as part of the LTS, then a nuclear 
energy subsystem went through only the first two, to some extent three, phases Hughes 
introduces. If, on the other hand, we were to view a build-up of knowledge, research facilities 
and results as a system in its own right, the picture is different. We can then trace it up to the 
phase of growth. Competition is irrelevant in the Norwegian case as the nuclear pursuit was 
founded upon cooperative efforts and openness. Consolidation was – and so far still is – out of 
reach. We can, however, observe the phases of invention, development, and transfer (through 
the Norwegian eagerness to share and cooperate) to other countries of knowledge and 
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expertise as well as diffusion of knowledge into Norway through contacts abroad and 
scientists from other countries spending time at Norwegian facilities. Growth – on the non-
commercial side – was visible until the sixties in terms of funding and personnel at IFA and 
other institutions, as well as increasing numbers of initiatives towards achievement of the 
goal.  
There were objections, like that of Haakon Sandvoll at Christian Michelsen‟s Institute that 
“too strong a focus on nuclear energy […] would not be in proportion to the country‟s 
resources,”52 due to the size of the project and it draining Norway of engineering expertise. 
All the more credit can as such be given system-builder Gunnar Randers for successfully 
mobilizing the enormity of resources he did compared to what was available in a post-war 
Norway. Positive feedback-loops did, for a while, assist the growth of activities and support 
and the likelihood of a system establishment. The strong connection between an enterprising 
goal-oriented scientific community and political will led to the required levels of funding and 
priority. A core group of skilled individuals with international experience and contacts, and an 
abiding policy of openness and maintenance of international connections made for good 
channels of knowledge diffusion and transfer. The openness of the system greatly increased 
its chances of successful consolidation. Through, “exchange programs” for researchers; the 
sharing of knowledge and invitation of foreign scientists to spend time at Norwegian research 
facilities those with the know-how in Norway were able to keep abreast with international 
developments, learn of new developments and staff Norwegian facilities without enlarged 
salary expenses. Gundersen, Høyer et al. even felt “IFA developed into the world‟s first 
international school for education of nuclear power scientists and reactor personnel.”53 In tune 
with this active international cooperation projects like JENER agreement with the Netherlands 
not only bought goodwill but allowed Norway to undertake activities otherwise out of range 
for a small country with limited resources. Of technological style can, in addition to type of 
reactor, be mentioned uses to which nuclear expertise would/could be put (medicine, research, 
civil/military). The style of the nuclear industry as oriented towards civil usage made it easier 
to swallow and provide official backing after the war experiences and the fears accompanying 
the onset of the Cold War. Accompanied by the – initially – positive media coverage and 
enrolment of important partners in industry, an impressive albeit temporary momentum was 
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accomplished. The system seemed for a while to gain momentum when actors from the 
different arenas coalesced and worked together and the figures both of money invested and 
people involved grew significantly and two reactors were in operation.  
 
5.2.2. Weaknesses of the system-building process     
The momentum came to a halt and reverse salients joined forces with changing surroundings 
and the system-building was impeded.  One weakness lay in the disregard of the natural role 
of the universities in a system of this kind. A traditional port for research, they were not 
enlisted as significant components of, and supporters of, the nuclear power venture. Rather 
they were made to feel side-lined and in competition for funding, and did voice their 
concerns. Competition – if the relevant term – occurred at a stage in the system building 
where the system was not yet mature enough for that to be a positive factor. Although 
research and work with good results were conducted by IFA and their cohorts, and their level 
of openness and cooperation with international actors were favorable to the growth of the 
system; stronger links to universities could have been a strengthening factor nonetheless. 
Though not the lone deciding factor it was one weaker link. The wider support of the 
educational institutions is important and might entail the broadening of the adherent base. 
Rather than adding to system momentum they became skeptical of the amounts of funding 
and developed into a curbing feature.  
A while into the system building process it became clear that Norway might be backing the 
wrong horse – focusing on a reactor-type that did not win through as the obvious choice in 
other countries. Though perhaps not a cause for direct criticism, it became something of a 
dead end with regards to business opportunities abroad for the Norwegian nuclear industry 
and became a reverse salient.  A greater cause for scrutiny was the failure to create legitimacy 
for the technology.  
Obtaining acceptance among the wider population is vital to the successful and durable 
formation of a technological system. Public opinion became a reverse salient. In the course of 
a short period of time organized opposition groups had appeared, seeing it as their mission to 
prevent a nuclear power plant in their respective localities.
54
 Environmental concerns spread 
in the population and after a period of somewhat dispersed objections and protests, Aksjon 
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mot Atomkraft (AMA – Front Against Nuclear Power) was established April 1974. “It was 
then said that the weight of the opposition would now shift from focusing on the localization 
problem and more on the principle sides of nuclear power.”55 AMA was a loosely tied 
together unit of action, never an organization with a stable concrete platform. What the 
members all had in common was a “no” to nuclear power, and they were otherwise free to 
argue their case on whatever basis they saw fit. Fighting a large opposition with one cause but 
multiple motives was a reality those working and lobbying for nuclear power were not 
adequately prepared for.  
In keeping with its duties of administering the water/energy resources in Norway, NVE 
(Norges Vassdrags- og energidirektorat – Norway‟s Water Resources- and Energy 
Directorate) was granted responsibility of planning Norway‟s first nuclear power plant by the 
Parliament. The need for energy was growing, especially with the increased focus on energy 
intensive industries. It was “believed to develop alongside the curve for increased economic 
growth. […] Nuclear power was at the time viewed as a good alternative to continued 
expansion of hydropower capacity.”56 NVE came to encounter mounting and resilient 
resistance by the mentioned groups as they began to indicate possible locations and concrete 
plans throughout the country. Norges Naturvernforbund (NNV, Norway‟s Nature Preservation 
Association) had originally supported nuclear power as an option allowing for preservation of 
waterfalls worthy of protection, like for example the Mardøla waterfall. Their stance shifted 
as they came to consider the environmental dimensions of nuclear power. On their side were 
others; in indirect association with the AMA was also the group “Physicists in Trondheim”, 
consisting of scientific personnel from NTH (Norway‟s Technical College) and AVH (The 
General Scientific College) and headed by Professor Wergeland. Wergeland had been against 
the activities of IFA and was vice president of AMA. The result of proliferating misgivings 
about nuclear power was numerous confrontations between NVE and IFA on the one hand 
and, in particular, AMA and NVE on the other.
57
 There were notable differences in how 
champions and resisters saw the core of the dispute and the impending choice. “IFA and NVE 
sought to make this a case of priority along the lines of most other choices in society, while 
NNV underlined those sides of nuclear power which in their opinion made the choice of 
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energy form to a choice based on values.”58 No matter how one viewed the choice-to-come, 
most people ended up returning to a few contested issues dominating the debates – security 
regarding serious accidents during operation; storage of waste; and proliferation of weapons 
material. These are the issues that have prevailed to today‟s debates.   
In hindsight another weak link seems to be unrealistic and utopian visions on Norway‟s behalf 
for the potential nuclear power could have. In order for an innovation to find foothold visions 
need to pass the test of reality. A realistic interpretation of surroundings should be made at an 
early stage in order to combat obstacles and lay out the best path. In addition to the reverse 
salient of public opinion there were other points that in retrospection should have been object 
of greater awareness and attention. In cost-benefit evaluations, cost appears to have been too 
high compared with actual advantages. Noratom gradually waded into an unforeseen 
quagmire, “shareholders were too small to – alone – carry such hefty and long-term and 
investments in the nuclear field, even if they were the elite in Norwegian business.”59 They 
were also not synchronized enough to be willing to make that financial lift for nuclear energy; 
no one coordinated their endeavors with sufficient authority.
60
 Noratom‟s mission was to 
provide assignments to the industry, to perform marketing and deliver tenders. It had small 
means of its own and “the industry never came on board with nuclear efforts in the same way 
as the modernizing group.”61 Norsk Hydro backed out eventually, very likely for financial 
reasons.  
The market was inadequate; where other countries developed a dire need for increased and 
secure supply of energy, this was a near absent impetus in Norway. Nuclear advocates failed 
to take into account that Norway‟s generous portion of accessible natural resources became an 
impediment to the nuclear cause. Even in neighboring Sweden the situation was quite 
different. Despite a level of opposition similar to Norway, nuclear power was trumped 
through. Sejersted puts this down to – first – Norway‟s fortunate endowment of hydropower, 
and later the oil from the 1970s.
62
 A major part of Norway‟s energy needs were covered 
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through hydropower. Oil became the new love-child as a national industry and export 
opportunity. Companies like Hydro moved efforts to oil pursuits; Scandpower similarly 
shifted to accommodate primarily oil interests over nuclear; IFA lost its place at the political 
high-table. Power plants powered by natural gas became an idea to substitute nuclear power 
plants.    
Before the dormant in-between period The Nuclear Power Committee (headed by Granli; 
referred to as the Granli-Committee) was set up on initiative by the government to evaluate 
security problems in relation to the operation of nuclear power plants, transport and storage of 
radioactive material and therein make a recommendation for (or against) nuclear power in 
Norway. It was active from February 1976 to October 1978 when its final report was handed 
in. Born in a time of societal tumult and change, the committee‟s final recommendation failed 
to serve as “the solution to alleviation of the uncertainty a majority in Parliament 
expressed.”63 It nonetheless marks an important point in Norway‟s nuclear history as “it was 
IFA‟s last concrete attempt at signing Norway up for commercial nuclear power.”64 Elements 
of the report-writing process as well as the set-up of the committee have been criticized as 
untidy. Though Reistad notes that the committee‟s “main conclusion ostensibly opened for 
nuclear power in Norway”65, he goes on to observe that “[they] were closer to a „no‟ than the 
„yes‟ it was perceived as.”66 It thus appeared too toothless to provide definite ground for a 
“yes” to commercial nuclear power, despite a number of proponents among its members. 
Incidents on the international arena served to – temporarily – silence any pull from that 
direction. “Round one” was over and Norway witnessed a flight of competence to other fields 
or countries.       
5.2.3. The Hiatus 
In between “round one and two” the topic nuclear power was not seriously raised; the Three 
Mile Island and Chernobyl accidents sealed the its coffin through public opinion. Times 
changed and changed again. The environmentalists of the „seventies were anti-nuclear; 
although many still are the picture is not as clear. Knowledge about GHGs and their harmful 
                                                          
63
 Reistad, O. C., Kampen om Kjernekraften – en analyse av Kjernekraftutvalget 1975-78,1995, page 228 
64
 Reistad, O. C., Kampen om Kjernekraften – en analyse av Kjernekraftutvalget 1975-78, 1995, page 227 
65
 Reistad, O. C., Kampen om Kjernekraften – en analyse av Kjernekraftutvalget 1975-78, 1995, page 194 
66
 Reistad, O. C., Kampen om Kjernekraften – en analyse av Kjernekraftutvalget 1975-78, 1995, page 213 
 37 
effects has deepened and the status of oil has changed. The wider awareness of climate 
changes is conjoined with concerns about impending “peak oil” and affects societal attitudes. 
After a nuclear moratorium of around twenty-five years it is back on the table internationally. 
Improvements on safety and technology are highlighted and alternative strands, such as 
thorium, have received attention.  It took thorium‟s freshness to bring the nuclear discussion 
back to Norway. Its potential will be dissected below, in accordance with the seven functions 
cited in the theory section. System-building and innovation are not clear or simple processes, 
and the scholarly literature reflects this. The analysis according to the seven functions might 
therefore seem somewhat streamlined. In a thesis with a stated aim like this one, however, I 
found it appropriate to do it this way in order to attain the goal.  
5.3. Round two: Thorium in Norway; assessed according to the Seven Functions within the 
TIS framework  
Reminder of the Seven Functions: 1) Entrepreneurs; 2) knowledge development; 3) 
knowledge diffusion; 4) guidance of the search (expectations, visions, policy goals, 
demands, selection); 5) market formation (niche markets, feed-in tariffs); 6) resource 
mobilization; 7) advocacy coalition (Creation of legitimacy / counteract resistance of 
change).  
5.3.1. Function One: Entrepreneurs 
In the TIS building process around thorium there is no visible core group with the same 
focused zeal as during “round one”. There is no system-builder in the same fashion as Gunnar 
Randers either. There is, however, an individual to which the term “entrepreneur” from 
innovation studies literature is a suitable name. Innovation theorist Schumpeter highlighted 
the importance of these individuals to the innovation process. In short, the entrepreneur is 
considered to possess a drive and a determination to create beyond that of mere profit-
seekers. The entrepreneur has a vision and follows it with enthusiasm and passion, persistence 
and perseverance. He/she devises strategies to turn it from idea into reality, and takes initial 
responsibility to trigger its effect. As the system-builder, the entrepreneur is unlikely to 
remain in a high position in the company but rather embark upon new quests. Alf Bjørseth is 
the present man to put under this heading. “Father of REC and the Norwegian solar energy 
industry” is a phrase often heard following his name. He left a leading role in REC behind and 
started up a next company called NorSun, daughter company of Bjørseth-owned Scatec 
(Scandinavian Advanced Technology). Scatec describes itself as hatching-ground for new 
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business ideas in the fields of renewable energy, environmentally friendly and advanced 
materials. Drawing on a wide international network they evaluate trends and new technologies 
within areas of competence where Norway is traditionally strong; and based on the best 
concepts Scatec invests and develops new companies. In their own words – “it is the joy of 
creating that drives us.”67 As another significant individual in the early days of the thorium 
debate – Egil Lillestøl – threw the lit thorium-torch into Norway. It was promptly picked up 
by Scatec, resulting in the creation of Thor Energy. Though there were others - companies as 
well as individuals - displaying interest and relaying to acquire rights and licenses to 
promising thorium-pastures, Thor Energy is currently the only company (owned by the only 
individual) which fits the description of the vital function number one – turning the potential 
of new knowledge development, networks and markets into concrete action generating and 
taking advantage of new business opportunities. Statkraft has since signed up as interested 
party to follow the project and keep abreast with developments. It is, however, on its own not 
a significant driving force.  
In a TIS perspective the strength for the thorium case is here that Bjørseth/Scatec-initiatives 
have formerly proven successful. A combination of the ability to recognize new business 
opportunities and capacity to follow them to market promises potential for success, and thus 
assisting the facilitating of a TIS around thorium through the inclusion of other actors along 
the way. An example from their track record is the creation of a solar energy industry, which 
for many is not the instinctive choice for a country as far north as Norway. Although Bjørseth 
– often channeled through Scatec – possesses the talent for backing visions up with action, his 
portfolio of interests is wider than that of the “old” nuclear zealots. This makes efforts 
somewhat more pragmatic; it is not the aim to force nuclear power upon Norway at any price 
in the same way that Randers and his cronies were prone to attempt. While they harbored a 
deep and enduring belief in the good of nuclear power; and while they had only that one 
focus; there is no such individual or group in “round two”. Bjørseth/Scatec possesses the right 
characteristics and skills, but have several legs to stand on, several ideas to follow up on. Thor 
Energy is merely one of their initiatives. Although it is taken seriously and followed up, in 
comparison with last round it is not done with the same fervor. Though the plan involves 
building a thorium-fuelled power plant in Norway, they will build where they are granted 
permission. As Sven Røst of Scatec says, “we are not interested in a crusade to get nuclear 
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power to Norway at any price, we will build if we are invited to do so, but in the end it is 
entirely up to the government and local authorities to decide whether or not to build a power 
plant in Norway.” Though this may be viewed as a more sympathetic stance by some, it 
indicates a weaker push for the cause than last round.  
5.3.2. Functions Two and Three: Knowledge Development (Learning) and Knowledge 
Diffusion through Networks 
Function two and three are closely linked and interrelated in the case of thorium in Norway 
owing to the petite scientific and business communities the country provides. They appear to 
have developed side-by-side rather than one-by-one, and will be evaluated under one heading. 
This was among the first features I discovered when conducting the interviews; most, if not 
all, knew each other or knew of each other. It is an interesting “playing field” with actors 
possessing easily discernable roles. The old heavy-weight having been aboard from the start – 
IFE (former IFA) – is the central player with authority in the field that most other actors pass 
through in their pursuits. Thor Energy and sidekick Statkraft are the newcomers prodding all 
corners for knowledge and thus assume the opposite role, being the one pursuing and swiping 
over all other potentially relevant actors. In between saunter other actors, notably from 
academia and then springing mainly out of the University of Oslo (UiO) and University of 
Bergen (UiB); from NTNU (Norway‟s Technical and Scientific University – former NTH), 
Norway‟s strong-point for process and material technologies and technical know-how; on the 
opposing team environmental organizations with minions;  and a few outspoken individuals 
with a special interest. Figuring so far chiefly as useful kit lining the sides of the playing field 
are several actors, presently of varying degree of passivity but all vital to one side‟s victory. 
These include authorities and government; the industrial community; venture capital and 
institutions like Innovasjon Norge, Forskningsrådet, SINTEF. All in all it is a battle about 
funding and public endorsement. There were ongoing nuclear activities as well as concerns 
about the dying-out and drying-up of knowledge before that aspect entered the public sphere 
through attention given the thorium-case. It appears, nevertheless, to have triggered farther-
ranging efforts and also spurring new links and opportunities. Being something of a natural 
and unavoidable hub regarding nuclear knowledge and activity, IFE seems a good starting 
point for evaluating these two functions.  
IFE (IFA) has since “round one” changed name to the more innocuous-sounding Institute for 
Energy Technology, and broadened its repertoire of tasks and skills. Interviewee Sverre Hval 
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– also member of the Thorium Committee – is one of two men at IFE‟s Kjeller-location with 
reactor competence, the other being managing director Kjell Bendiksen. Neither has worked 
with that in a long time. IFE‟s atomic energy activities (all research) are mainly at their 
Halden-location. Though there is not competence for running a nuclear power station, both he 
and other interviewees point out there is unique and good competence there and they have 
good international contacts as the facilities are widely used for testing by the international 
community. Of links that do and will run through IFE these can be perceived:     
 
5.3.2. a) International contacts 
 
From what used to be a haven for the original group aspiring for a nuclear Norway, IFA was 
transformed into IFE. Despite unpopularity with certain environmental segments in Norway, 
IFE‟s skills in the nuclear field are still held in high regard by those in that line of work. Its 
good reputation is maintained abroad also; there is great interest in using their testing 
facilities. One supposed reason for the survival of the Halden Reactor is its partaking in 
Halden Reactor Project, a project under OECD and NEA (Nuclear Energy Agency). The 
project has been going on for fifty years and is the largest joint project of the NEA. Bringing 
together an important international technical network in areas of nuclear fuel reliability, 
integrity of reactor internals, plant control/monitoring and human factors
68
; it is supported by 
130 organizations spanning the borders of seventeen countries. It is based predominantly on 
experiments and analyses as well as product development carried out in Norway at the Halden 
establishment. Through it Norway has managed to keep a foot in the door of the international 
nuclear community, preserving international contacts and channels of knowledge sharing that 
could be widened in the event that Norway should embrace the idea of commercial nuclear 
power on its soil. 
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5.3.2. b) Business-to-business, and business-to-IFE   
 
Companies aspiring to establish a nuclear power plant in the country, like Thor Energy, would 
come through IFE with testing of for example thorium-based fuel rods. IFE would thus enjoy 
a link to nuclear business in Norway, and would provide a natural source from which to 
harvest enduring expertise. An agreement on using their testing facilities in Halden for 
thorium fuel rods is underway for Thor Energy. For further progress the opportunity to take 
advantage of IFE facilities and experience is important. There are not many other relevant 
companies with an expressed interest in thorium. In Norway the main companion is Statkraft 
(and through them Statkraft-owned Skagerak Energi). Statkraft‟s thorium project is motivated 
chiefly by a focus on research and development; raising competence; and acquiring a 
knowledge platform to keep abreast. Skagerak Energi‟s Wilhelm Rondeel is part of Statkraft‟s 
project and articulates a wish to see “more people of Bjørseth‟s caliber, who want to shape the 
future not just watch it.” In his view Statkraft is big enough to be an active player in molding 
the process rather than just “tagging along”. Statkraft was recruited by Thor Energy and the 
latter has shared plans and knowledge through meetings and presentations. Rondeel aired 
ideas of a cooperative effort with another large Nordic actor – Vattenfall – and believes in 
establishing good connections with the Swedish and Finnish milieus. The EU is presently not 
as great a focus although it is not easy to neglect.  Being a small company, Thor Energy, 
nurtures international contacts at most stages in the process. Through its technical advisory 
board it collects competence and knowledge from Norwegian as well as international actors, 
among them the IAEA. Sven Røst described cooperative efforts with other significant Nordic 
actors like Vattenfall as potentially part of the future strategy – though not in reference to the 
reactor building. A feasibility study with regards to possibility of running thorium-based fuel 
in generation three reactors was recently conducted in collaboration with other Nordic actors 
like Vattenfall and Chalmers University, deeming it doable.  
 
5.3.2. c) Grass-root link 
 
IFE is open to high school students and provides guided tours for class outings. It is at present 
a side-point but it would be of substance in the case that Norway opts for commercial nuclear 
energy production. Nuclear-related subjects is not a decoying career path today, but in the 
event that it were such outings would provide a golden opportunity for rousing interest among 
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students about to make choices for their future. It introduces them to the nuclear industry and 
is as such a wise move.    
 
5.3.2. d) Links to future education programs 
 
Høyskolen i Akershus (HiAk – Akershus College) is located just beside IFE at Kjeller. HiAk 
and Akershus Energi
69
 recently came to an agreement on financing of a four-year professorate 
within sustainable energy systems and environment; the new professor will work together 
with physics professor Jon Samseth. This enables the college to build up its own knowledge 
base
70
 with good opportunity for knowledge diffusion through – and in cooperation with – 
IFE. Samseth, being a believer in the upholding current nuclear competence and further 
developing it, presented visions also of establishing studies in that field. He advocates the 
setting up of an education program for operational engineers of nuclear power plants at HiAk 
and building a mockup control room there, and including training at the nearby Kjeller 
reactor. Being a man of many contacts he is involved also with planning related studies at 
NTNU in Trondheim. The coming academic year five students have expressed a wish to write 
a master thesis on nuclear-related topics; two on reprocessing; two on reactor analysis and one 
on the technical sides of non-proliferation. In addition to this a full master course will be 
offered from the spring of 2009, covering the full range of the “value chain” from elements 
like reactor technology to fuel, waste, reprocessing and non-proliferation. It will be an 
elective subject aimed at students from physics, chemistry, energy & environment or 
industrial economics. Coming full circle, Samseth is also connected to the business side 
through his seat at the technical advisory board for Thor Energy.  
 
5.3.2. e) IFE and academia 
 
IFE is, moreover, incorporated in the plans of the wider academia via initiatives of the 
University of Bergen and SAFE (Senter for Akseleratorbasert Forskning og Energifysikk – 
Centre for Accelerator based Research and Energy Physics) at the University of Oslo. The 
latter is based around Norway‟s only particle accelerator in use and provides a foundation so 
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nuclear chemists and physicists can perform research. It is not directed towards nuclear 
research for energy production purposes. “It would have been impossible to get funding for it” 
claims Jon Petter Omtvedt from SAFE. The paid activity is directed towards medicine. It is 
the biggest scientific community in the country for nuclear research and technology. 
Nevertheless we find, relatively speaking, quite a small group of five steady (-ish) employees; 
two full-time employees – one physicist and one chemist, two – both chemists – in 50% 
positions, one YFF (Yngre Fremragende Forskere – Young Great Scientists). In addition 
come five post-docs, eight PhD students and approximately the same at master level. In 
Bergen the university can boast a handful, literally, of individuals. It is a small scientific 
milieu with specialized basic research. They can swank also connections abroad. Professor 
Jan S. Vaagen has had several involvements with international forums and associations and 
had an opening speech at the Nuclear Technology Development session at this year‟s ECT 
(Energy-Climate-Technology) Conference. Among his colleagues there are also strong 
connections to – and participation in projects at - CERN (European Organization for Nuclear 
Research) in Switzerland. Discussions are ongoing for a consortium between UiO, UiB and 
IFE and there is a joint aspiration for the strengthening of the universities‟ competence – and 
educational base within nuclear sciences. An application for permission to establish a center 
for work on nuclear research has already been submitted and declined – an initiative to build 
an education center. Efforts continue and another application will be submitted under the 
caption of renewable and environmentally friendly technology, in collaboration with several 
actors. There is a shared belief that a giant lift is required for the revitalization of the 
knowledge base – or even just its maintenance. There is a small window not to be missed due 
to many soon-to-be retirees among those with relevant competence. They express a wish to 
have Trondheim‟s NTNU aboard the same ship, and they will take part in the process of the 
mentioned application. Succeeding with cooperation across all institutions in Norway is 
considered important by these actors.  
 
5.3.2. f) The “old “IFE and the “new” Thor Energy bridging a gap  
 
Many elements of the Trondheim-centered initiatives and ideas, and those of the Bergen-Oslo 
axis are analogous; what they view as most imperative differs slightly however.  The “hands-
on” knowledge from Trondheim within areas like process and materials technology is 
considered useful but more on the side of the knowledge mainstay by the Bergen/Oslo 
connection. On the other hand, worded by Samseth, it is those strengths that are of core 
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importance. This divergence serves perhaps as a give-away to differing aims too. Though 
making explicit they are not against each other‟s end goals, the former appears to value 
preservation of essential knowledge as the first and foremost incentive while the latter seems 
more motivated by the prospect of attainment of commercial nuclear power plants in Norway.    
 
IFE is central in both the intended paths, though the nudges and prods may come from 
different angles. In a small country where anything nuclear has long had a weak standing both 
politically and with the public there is not room for two different strands at this stage. A 
pooling of all types of relevant competence as well as ideas and strategies would be more 
likely to succeed, rather than a premature competition for funds and public grace. This was 
voiced by interviewees and a sketch illustrating all official and unofficial links would reveal 
them all to be playing for the same team thus far. The common denominator of IFE and its 
central role to both could prove to be a facilitator for further cooperation, though at present it 
still appears something of a potential weak spot. Meeting through “the old”, one will find their 
paths cross also in “the new”. As mentioned, Samseth provides that linkage through his 
association to Thor Energy through its technological advisory board. The company has also 
enlisted SAFE through the financing of one master student. This student will spend some time 
abroad at a laboratory, studying the use of thorium as fuel in conventional reactors. They have 
also expressed will to finance one more. 
5.3.2. g) Historical link: Scandpower 
Scandpower has survived since “round one”, and expanded beyond Norwegian borders as a 
respected consultancy company. Its activities in the nuclear field have moved abroad, though, 
and its activities in Norway are in other fields. Consequently, as a rough estimate by Bjørn 
Inge Bakken reveals: “90 % of our nuclear competence is located abroad and while 99 % of 
our nuclear services is directed to projects abroad.” A majority is centered on Sweden, a lot in 
the US and some in China. Their nuclear competence is broad all the same [to the best of his 
knowledge with no specific efforts towards thorium], with some engineering staff having 
previously worked in nuclear power plants; staff with competence in reactor technology and 
radiation. They also sell software related to nuclear power, and over half of all upgraded 
nuclear power plants around the world use their software. Security analyses are also among 
their repertoire. The reason for bringing Scandpower into the discussion is its ties to the 
history of nuclear power here in Norway. Their level of competence is high in the nuclear 
field although this is exploited primarily in other countries. When questioned on the issue, 
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Bakken responded that he believed Scandpower could play a useful role in Norway in the case 
of nuclear power winning through. Its head office is still located at Kjeller, neighboring IFE. 
In addition to an advisory/assisting role to a nuclear industry it might provide further 
incentive to students considering that type of education. Students are diverse and likewise 
their interests and this could provide an additional and interesting career path/option.  
5.3.2. h) The hole  
A big noticeable deficit of the system thus far both with regards to skill and interest is the 
absence of research institutes and innovation institutions. These are traditionally important in 
Norway. Upon contacting for example Innovasjon Norge (Innovation Norway), they relayed 
their lack of projects/knowledge related to the nuclear field and commented that there were no 
plans to alter the situation in the near future. Forskningsrådet (The Research Council) was 
given the task of setting up the Thorium Committee through which the Thorium Report was 
conceived in February this year, 2008. Beyond that there has been no activity around nuclear 
power in any form, whether in the time before or after. In April this year SINTEF organized a 
seminar on the “Norwegian energy mix in 2050”, presenting different options and scenarios. 
Thorium was not mentioned at all except by the lead speaker commenting that it was absent 
from the program, and receiving no answer. Scientists with different fields of expertise were 
invited to talk about present level of research in their field and what might be possible to put 
together as a mix of energy technologies in our future society. Nuclear power was not part of 
the picture. Among my interviewees a couple mentioned SINTEF as a place harboring 
relevant competence. Upon contacting them for information about it I was referred to IFE 
with the comment that that is where this competence is found. SINTEF thus appears to hold 
no large amount of relevant competence or interest. They do, however, possess much related 
knowledge to that of NTNU and good connections to it. In the same way as with NTNU, these 
skills can become pertinent if general interest is roused in SINTEF at large rather than 
remaining with a few individuals.    
5.3.2. i) General comments 
When coming from the outside there appears currently to be a good network of channels and 
forums for cooperation and knowledge sharing. Many open arms were to be found, whether to 
embrace or reach out but often both. There were no closed doors and few restrictions as to 
what people were willing to share, regardless of their position. From what an outsider could 
ascertain there was much of the same tone between people of the different groups of know-
 46 
how. This combined with small scientific and business communities in this field permits a 
certain degree of transparency and overview. Norway‟s situation allows for efficient and far-
ranging knowledge development and diffusion – this is not the greatest impediment. The 
identified weak-spots might, however, prove a challenge. Recruitment of research institutes 
should be a prioritized task, and the prevention of the creation of divergent paths of those 
chasing the thorium-dream, the nuclear power plant idea and those conservatively pursuing 
the preservation of general nuclear competence. They are in many ways two sides of the same 
cause as they are dependent on many of the same facets and institutions. Norway does not 
provide a hospitable environment for a nuclear industry and by pulling together and in the 
same direction the chance of accomplishing their goal seems raised for all.       
5.3.3. Function Four: Guidance of the Search 
5.3.3. a) Role of the government 
In this the case the government proves more of an obstacle than a catalyst. The murmur in the 
nuclear community revolved around former minister of oil and energy instigating the work 
behind the Thorium Committee when lured by an idea of profit upon hearing about thorium. 
So far that gesture has proved a false signal of hope for those waiting for a change of attitude 
among politicians; concerns subsist that the Committee‟s report will end up in a drawer and 
the topic left behind. Its conclusions were that the thorium in Norway‟s possession will not be 
an imminent source of wealth. As nuclear power has long been a topic politically dead, it – 
and with it thorium – has subtly “re-slipped” off the urgent agenda. What is not done can be 
as decisive as what is done. Another government-appointed committee is the 
Lavutslippsutvalget (Low Emissions Committee), handing in its final report October 2006. 
Among its recommendations for possible measures to cut emissions of GHGs nothing about 
nuclear power was mentioned. When questioned on the matter, head of the committee Jørgen 
Randers replied that any ideas about nuclear power – whether conventional or in the future 
thorium-based – were promptly abandoned. Their reasoning was that climate problems can be 
solved with other known technology and that nuclear power is politically unacceptable in 
Norway. The issue was equally absent from Norklima‟s agenda at their conference in May 
2008. Norklima is a research program looking at climate changes and consequences for 
Norway as basis for societal adaptive measures, and nuclear power is not considered a 
possible solution. A bit of “black humor” allows my interviewees to pull a smile through 
exasperation at politicians quoting a bill of Parliament from the 1970s declaring that there will 
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be no nuclear power in Norway. When questioned by Fremskrittspariet (The Progress Party) 
on whether or not anything would be done by the government, Magnhild Meltveit-Kleppa 
retorted by referring to the bill. The full text, however, reads “in this century” – now eight 
years overdue. A new law of the kind has not yet been declared or discussed. It is, however, 
engrained in many minds. These examples are illustrative of the not exactly insubstantial 
hurdles that must be overcome before it can become a reality in Norway. Another example is 
the issue of IFE‟s licensing. Sverre Hval compares the situation of then and now by pointing 
out it took only three years from the establishment of IFA until the first reactor was up and 
running in 1951. Now the decision-making period has begun to drag out to the point where 
application for a mere renewal of a long-standing license for the two currently running 
reactors takes approximately three years. The application was handed in two years ago 
(interview from April 2008) and it might be ready before New Year, when the present license 
runs out.  
5.3.3. b) Expectations 
Expectations are cited as another potentially aiding factor in the TIS-building process. At 
present in Norway, it seems more likely that assistance can be harvested that way. 
International expectations are a good starting point. Internationally expectations for a revival 
and expansion of nuclear power are increasingly often voiced – and with more credibility than 
in Norway due to a higher likelihood of acceptance for the cause. In order for it to come alive 
here, it must be inspired from abroad. As Wilhelm Rondeel of Statkraft‟s daughter company 
Skagerak Energi puts it: “the development in the world around us must affect us regarding 
nuclear power. If it does not happen, it will never happen on its own here.” There are two 
recurring subjects lately dominating international discourse – climate change and energy, 
frequently interlinked. Though a dip in price was reached this summer oil prices have recently 
been soaring and have been coupled with scares of impending peak oil. In the wake of these 
affairs worries have grown with respect to security of energy supply. Combined with the 
realization that long-prophesized climate changes due to global warming are in fact genuine 
and severe, the hunt for deliverance has been both amplified and broadened. When 
deliberating future solutions long-confirmed foe nuclear power has been invited back to the 
discussion table. In their June 21
st
 2008 edition The Economist devoted near twenty pages to a 
special report on the future of energy. The section on nuclear power is fittingly titled “Life 
After Death”. In an article dated June 24 2008 the Norwegian newspaper Aftenposten reports 
that expensive oil opens for more nuclear power. Interest is rising and the IAEA expects 
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considerable growth over the next twelve years. “The agency‟s most recent prediction 
estimates around 300 new nuclear power plants over mentioned twelve years (a growth of 
sixty percent).”71 Thirty-four are under construction as I write. Hans-Holger Rogner of the 
IAEA states they can “sense a slow but steady change of public opinion; the reasons for 
which are believed to be the discussion on global warming, energy security and the fact that 
nuclear power can reduce the need for ever more expensive oil, coal and gas.”72 He points 
also to a notable correlation between requests and countries ratifying the Kyoto protocol. 
Nuclear power is back, but overcoming prevalent misgivings and a real image-problem is still 
a challenge.     
The climate-argument can be, and is, employed by different factions for different purposes. It 
depends on what aspect is weighted the most, and whether one adheres to a short-term or 
long-term evaluation of climate protection. Proponents of nuclear energy often advocate the 
former. The threat of global warming is seen as so dire that something must be done with 
immediate effect. The articulate and highly quotable Hans Blix said it with clarity: “I am 
more worried about global warming in fifty years than that a gram of plutonium should leak 
in 10 000 years time.”73 Though the long-term problems of waste handling have traditionally 
been a high-seat argument of the environmental movements, concerns over the pace and 
scope of the degenerative effects of climate changes have swayed old allegiances. One the 
Greenpeace-founders, Patrick Moore, now believes nuclear power to be the only solution that 
can save the world.
74
 His views are seconded by scientist and environmentalist James 
Lovelock, inventor of the Gaia-theory, who believes nuclear power is not a long-term solution 
but necessary short-term. “It is too late for a sustainable development. What we need is a 
sustainable contraction. Civilization is in danger and we MUST use nuclear power now […] 
so Earth may rest. I recommend nuclear power only as efficient nurture.”75 Large segments of 
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the environmental movements still argue the traditional case that we are leaving behind an 
enormous and hazardous waste problem for generations to come. There are also scientists to 
be found in that camp, exemplified here by Isaac Winograd and Eugene Rosenboom Jr of US 
Geological Survey. They claim it is ok “to admit the limits to our abilities to predict and 
explain. […] It is impossible to know with certainty what will happen to highly radioactive 
waste over a period of hundreds of thousands of years.”76 Concurring is Dieter Röhrich of 
UiB and CERN. “We [human kind] are not morally ready for nuclear power on a large scale,” 
he says and points to how much things change over what in the big picture is short periods of 
time. His examples are the changes in France and Germany‟s situation the last sixty years, or 
Norway the last four hundred. The Economist’s answer to the waste problem is indeed the 
attitude criticized as naïve by the adherents of long-term climate considerations: “the best 
answer really is to bury the stuff for the time being. That should be done in places where it 
can easily be recovered for reprocessing one day when technology has caught up.”77 Though 
theoretically possible to argue both sides of the case convincingly, it is symptomatic of our 
time that the former argument can now win through at all. The climate change issue has 
allowed new leverage to a drowning industry and alleviated the strain of political 
incorrectness. Whether the most excessive predictions of mass expansion come true or not, 
the international trend is one of restoration and growth.  
The climate issue applies to thorium as well, adding credibility to its better-than-thou image. 
Thorium is nonetheless not surrounded by a large flock of supporters abroad at present. India 
is the main aficionado, originally out of necessity. No countries were allowed to trade with 
India on any matter nuclear, due to India‟s failure to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Being 
in need of energy and short of uranium India turned to its source of abundance – thorium. 
American Thorium Power has recruited Hans Blix in service as consultant. The company 
cooperates, since 2007, with Russian state-owned Red Star and thorium is being tested in a 
Russian research reactor. “I don‟t think security itself will be better [with thorium] but the 
waste problem will be smaller,” says Blix in response to a question on improved security at 
Russian nuclear power plants through this cooperation. Indeed a general improvement in the 
waste situation is a major selling point used about thorium. “In relation to waste handling 
when using thorium, both radioactivity and volume are at a lower level than burned 
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uranium.”78 This was one selling point eagerly used in Norway too, by Egil Lillestøl when 
introducing thorium to the Norwegian public. Another is that “there is three times as much 
thorium as uranium in the earth‟s crust. It will last longer as an energy source, says Blix.”79 
Last selling point, again highlighted by Lillestøl in interviews (which he was later accused of 
oversimplifying), is the lessened threat of weapons proliferation. When Blix explains it to the 
layman, the crux is that “thorium contains little uranium, only 10-15 % in the fuel. The result 
is 80 % less plutonium than through the use of ordinary uranium. It is thus almost impossible 
to exploit the waste from thorium for weapons production. One can also mix in plutonium 
instead of uranium. That way the plutonium burns and one gets rid of it, Blix explains.”80 
What was revealed here is optimism on behalf of thorium on an international level, but 
limited to few projects/individuals. Despite sanguinity, establishing an industry around 
thorium is an unfinished process and one that is not the core focus of the international 
community. “There is presently no great interest among the main big companies. [In addition] 
the Generation IV project encompasses six reactor types, one of which is said to be able to run 
exclusively on thorium, the Molten Salt Reactor. There is little interest and of the six one is 
looking at it is the one with the least financing.”81 As an attempted conclusion to this point; 
the international pull towards nuclear power is there, not so much towards thorium. The 
option of partners in research and business is not absent but requires a more determined effort 
on the part of Norwegian actors.    
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5.3.3. c) Failure to fulfill sky-high expectations, and the role of the media 
Though the matter is not yet settled for good this point can prove a good example of the 
guiding element contained within expectations, and what happens when promises cannot be 
kept. In recent years thorium was pushed into the limelight through a CERN-project (the so-
called Rubbia-reactor) communicated through Professor Egil Lillestøl. The potential for 
utilization of Norwegian thorium-reserves sparked dreams of a Norwegian thorium-adventure, 
taking over the throne when the oil-industry is old and worn-out. Between November 14 and 
December 22 2006, the company Nordic Mining ASA secured rights to near fifty areas each 
of 250 000 square meters, in Alta, Hasvik, Levanger and Mosvik. Other companies were also 
quick to secure rights to areas where they saw potential for thorium extraction. Believed to be 
most promising reserve is the Fen Complex at Ulefoss in Telemark,  where the newly founded 
companies Thoriumpower Holding AS and Thorium Norway AS are operating. Thor Energy 
was quick to announce plans to build a nuclear power plant with a thorium fuel cycle in 
Norway – ideally with use of Norwegian thorium. Media was all over the case for a while – 
ranging from Aftenposten and DN (Dagens Næringsliv – Business Daily) to Teknisk Ukeblad 
and the tabloids. The craze died down like an overdue teenage fad. Uncertainty about the 
quality, accessibility and indeed accurate amount of Norwegian thorium arose and the 
Thorium Report concluded in February 2008 that the Norwegian thorium resource-dream 
does indeed have to wait for better days. Interviewed December 2007, Bjørseth had this to say 
about thorium: “It is expensive to build thorium-reactors, but the profitability is still good. 
The greatest challenge is to find general acceptance for nuclear power.”82 Though belief in 
future profit is still there, moderations have had to be made, alongside moderated plans for a 
power plant. Bjørseth may be right on his last point about public acceptance, though it is not 
the only obstacle even if it may be the most severe. Technical and political hurdles are 
accompanied by financial uncertainties as of yet not answered.  
In contemporary society media plays a huge role in shaping people‟s opinions and 
expectations, especially on topics otherwise inaccessible to the public. The case of nuclear 
power falls in that category as many people lack accurate knowledge about the workings of 
the technology beyond what they hear in the media. The thorium-vision excited Norwegian 
                                                          
82
 Ryvik, H., Industriens Superpappa, article published 13
th
 December 2007,  Prosessindustrien.no; 
http://www.prosessindustrien.no/default.asp?menu=6&id=4600, 09.06.08 
 
 52 
media for a while, nourishing the elevated expectations discussed above. Whether for or 
against nuclear power all of my interviewees commented on the misguided media dialogue. 
They criticized media for granting space and attention to certain individuals who are, at best, 
knowledgeable amateurs. Others slated zealots from the pro-side for overselling the thorium-
idea and through media hyping unfeasible expectations. The matter slid out of the immediate 
spotlight, and at the publishing of the Thorium Report the debate was declared dead in 
Teknisk Ukeblad by environmentalists like Norwegian Greenpeace. Many initiatives and 
individuals lured to jump on the thorium-bandwagon by grand promises fell off at this point. 
While a thorium-focus is rarer, nuclear power resurfaces in Norwegian media from time to 
time and sentiments from the international arena seep into it. Aftenposten, for example, 
published two consecutive articles on nuclear power during summer 2008 – June 24 and 26, 
the latter having picked up quotes and ideas from among others The Economist’s Energy 
Special. When present, the interest is no longer thorium-specific.  
5.3.4. Function Five and Six: Market Formation and Resource Mobilization  
5.3.4. a) Market 
There is presently no existing market for nuclear power production of any kind in Norway. 
Should the present mood prevail among authorities it is unlikely that any advancing measures 
– like consumption quotas or tax relief – will be introduced on behalf of nuclear power. 
Acquiring licenses – for the power plant, for fuel type, for waste storage plans – is an arduous 
enough route towards market. Unless an unexpected shift in priorities should occur, the 
government and authorities are reluctant observers in need of persuasion rather than 
facilitators. Especially with the Thorium Report once and for all shooting down the notion 
that Norwegian thorium reserves might be an immediate gold mine awaiting exploitation, 
interest dwindled. Market space must be carved out by other means at this point, in the wait 
for persuasion of the authorities. Pressure from the right actors, or approval and support of the 
right factions might be one way.  
5.3.4. b) Enlisting energy intensive industry 
Wilhelm Rondeel of Skagerak Energi has faith in the possibility of success for nuclear power 
but dependent on to what extent the energy intensive industry in Norway is interested in 
joining. Rondeel articulates an idea of a path like that of Finland where the industry is one of 
the main owners of the fifth reactor. Another idea could be to follow the scheme of 
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hydropower; instituting long term contracts with predictable price levels for nuclear power for 
a certain amount to the industry. He claims in comparison that should one choose the latter 
option for gas “this would be a hazard.” In the case of a downgrade of the size of the energy 
intensive industry enormous amounts of energy would be freed for other purposes, says Knur 
Halvor Alfsen of Cicero. In order for it to be an inducing factor to a nuclear power plan it is 
therefore imperative that we maintain, and preferable expand, that industrial sector. Jon 
Samseth is a firm believer that industry will indeed come onboard and push for nuclear 
power, as is Hans Blix. “Norwegian Industry is positive towards the idea that nuclear power 
can solve future energy shortages.” 83 The industry itself has uttered interest in several 
published articles. Stein Lier-Hansen, managing director of the organization Norsk Industri 
(Norwegian Industry), says “the modern societies – Norway, Europe, the world – need more 
and more power. Alongside this we must fulfill that need without emitting GHGs, namely 
CO2. Nuclear power stands as an alternative able to provide a lot of energy without 
contributing to that type of GHGs that emissions bring.”84 At the time, in 2007, he believed 
thorium-based nuclear power stood out as a good option. Several leaders from the industry 
support Lier-Hansen, but head of “round one”-proponent Hydro, Eivind Reiten, is now 
skeptical. He favors the idea of CCS (Carbon Capture and Storage) over the idea of nuclear.
85
 
5.3.4. c) Human Capital 
There was wide-spread concern among my interviewees that competence will disappear. As 
Professor Finn Ingebretsen relays; in the 1970s there were some adept people in the country 
but as the government made the decision to abandon the idea of nuclear power many 
disappeared to other professions and countries. Presently a large portion of the “remains” in 
Norway are nearing retirement age. But as Professor Samseth says: “what we do have is 
highly competent.” In the words of Rondeel: “it will be a problem to build up competence 
without a guarantee of acceptance to signal maintenance of career opportunities.” 
Nonetheless, the message from most is that we need to do it and it must happen now. A 
window of ~five years is presented.  The small group of the qualified is already onboard and 
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eager to take on a mentor-role to share of their knowledge and expertise; and is currently 
scheming to devise a path of preservation and expansion of the skills-base. This could perhaps 
be a drawback turned into something constructive; an inducement mechanism to get 
authorities aboard – temporarily at least. On a national level the present choice is not plainly 
nuclear or not nuclear; the choice is about having the choice and not having the choice. This 
factor could be exploited. 
5.3.4. d) Financial Capital 
Professor Vaagen posits that in addition to the wider academic milieu, the business 
community must be positive to the cause. Thor Energy persists with moderated but serious 
pursuits for a nuclear power plant fuelled by thorium. Beside the Statkraft/Skagerak Energi 
connection there are presently no other significant companies with announced plans of 
involvement in nuclear power with or without thorium. Investors like Stein Erik Hagen 
expressed positive interest in thorium-power in Norway
86
, but words have yet to become 
action. During “round one” four of the biggest companies in Norway at the time (Hydro, 
Elkem, Hafslund, Årdal & Sundal Verk) were party to the establishment of Scandpower, 
originally intended to exploit market potential for nuclear power. So far none of the biggest 
companies have signed up and Hydro (now part of StatoilHydro) expressed little interest. 
Venture capital has so far been elusive. Industry indicates having a positive stance; “NHO 
[Næringslivets Hovedorganisasjon – organization for businesses] has indicated an interest in 
this but have so far not been overtly outspoken with it,” states Rondeel. In the case of thorium 
the initiative must come from here and thus add pressure to the government, rather than the 
other way around as with many forms of renewable energy.  
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5.3.5. Function Seven: Advocacy Coalition 
The role of the advocacy coalition is to put the new technology on the agenda, gain a 
favorable atmosphere, mobilize resources on its behalf and create legitimacy for it. Hekkert et 
al. explain how it must either manage to become part of the incumbent regime or overthrow it. 
In terms of the Norwegian energy system, the aim is to be a supplement or complement to 
other energy sources. Overthrowing a regime involves the largest obstacles due to the amount 
of vested interests in everything from skills-base to financial investments, infrastructure, 
educational set-up and regulations. There are, nonetheless, substantial challenges to bringing a 
TIS to becoming part of a wider system also. Rather than merely outlining the elements of the 
advocacy coalition, I have chosen to identify the challenges and through those pinpoint the 
strong and weak points of it. The latter are the equivalent of reverse salients that are (and 
seem likely to become) obstacles in the system build-up.  
5.3.5. a) The need and the use 
A wide-spread perception that there is no real need for nuclear power in Norway is an 
obstacle in convincing both policy-makers and public opinion to favor it. Sufficient supply of 
hydropower and potential for heightening efficiency within hydropower use/supply is 
highlighted by several interviewees. Those firmly opposed to nuclear power also voice 
concerns about the channeling of too much of available resources such as engineers, research 
funding, and human capital, in the direction of nuclear industry when this is not a necessity 
for Norway, an echo of concerns voiced in “round one”. Other paths are advocated, such as 
wind power, wave and tidal power as well as hydropower. The time-span before a power plant 
could be operative was also criticized as stopper to the quick-fix concept of nuclear power, 
whether to the GHG problem or energy security problem.  
In response to the first concern, Thor Energy has continued to pursue the idea of a thorium-
driven nuclear power plant in the belief that there is a market – and thus a need – for it. Their 
efforts are founded in the belief that a national energy system is not to be seen in isolation. 
Though Norway has previously largely been able to sustain its energy consumption without 
relying on nuclear power, and been able to export large amounts of energy through its 
generous endowment of oil and gas, there are changes on the horizon. A large portion of the 
Norwegian population is located in or near Oslo and surrounding areas. Additionally the 
country‟s industrial base is located in Norway‟s southern half. With a considerable energy 
intensive industry as well as great need for heating (both principally powered by electricity) 
 56 
Norway hovers at the top of the list of the world‟s major energy consumers. Largely 
dependent on seasonal rainfall, the annual production of electricity fluctuates and the country 
is occasionally reliant on importing energy. By estimating a continued growth in the south-
east region, and quite possibly the electrification of oil and gas fields offshore, the issue of 
supply-security becomes relevant.  
A conceivable scenario revolving around a thorium-based power plant would involve building 
it the cited south-east region where it could help avert shortages by providing extra base-load 
capacity. This would release capacity for hydropower to be exported for “peak shaves” to the 
Northern European market. Norway‟s “ready reserves” (water stored in dams) can be supplied 
virtually without ado.  This all would allow Norway to maintain its identity as an energy-
exporting nation; initially alongside oil and gas though the latter two (mainly oil at first) will 
begin to dwindle. It is a feasible scenario, permitting Thor Energy‟s plans to supply an answer 
to questions of where the need or market will be found. Their under-way tests for thorium fuel 
rods would be employed in the presently used generation three reactors. They are positive that 
by the time legislation and constructions could be in place, the fuel will have caught up and be 
ready for action. Other voices have spoken up for mid-Norway as a possible location due to 
the energy quandaries of the region – caused mainly by industry. This predicament has found 
its likelier solutions in power plants based on gas, or wind power.  
The issue of what energy technology to “go for” is a question of priority and what technology 
one believes to have most potential in the given situation. It needs not, however, be a 
complete either/or. But the perception of nuclear power as the “bad guy” needs to be 
overcome in order for there to be any space or support for it. There is a more wide-spread fear 
and general qualm about nuclear power than other energy forms. Let us not, however, forget 
or underestimate localized popular opinion/action and its ability to put off decisions in 
relation also to other technologies. Many will be aware of the problems of opposition the 
Havsul project for wind power recently ran into. Further growth of hydropower is somewhat 
limited not only due to a scarcity of suitable dam-sites but also to do public opinion and 
environmental concerns over some areas. Some of the potential is already tied up in officially 
environmentally protected areas. Though – as of yet – nuclear power is to many the least 
desired option others are not without drawbacks either.  
High scores are reached for nuclear power with regards to emissions cuts and energy 
efficiency regarding resource use. It can still be regarded a “quick-fix” solution if quick is not 
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interpreted as “instant”. The time-lag between idea and reality is also very much dependent on 
political opinion and investment will. Thor Energy has fuel test plans under way and are not 
passively waiting for approval; work is being done along the way and thus not halting the 
progress in the event that it comes. Innovasjon Norge publishes a booklet on renewable 
energy annually and in it runs through the potential for a variety of options. For the required 
efficiency to be reached and for a functional system/industry to be created around the 
technology there are years to leap across for all of them; thus challenging that argument as 
something to be directed mainly at nuclear power, a reinforcing point not to be missed by the 
advocacy coalition.  
5.3.5. b) History, image and the agenda 
History and image have made it hard to get nuclear power back on the agenda in Norway. It 
seems a novel aspect was required. Concerns about a dwindling knowledge base had rested 
among the nuclear know-hows a while. Curtains of taboo were lifted and thorium proved to 
be an efficient device to get nuclear power at least back on the discussion table. Professor Egil 
Lillestøl threw out the bait of the so-called “Rubbia-reactor” accompanied by rapidly 
escalating reveries about the potential of Norwegian thorium reserves. Prospects of both the 
Rubbia-reactor and the Norwegian reserves proved dubious, and actors down-scaled and 
modified their plans. The question of overselling was raised by several interviewees. 
Nonetheless, despite the drawbacks the requirement for explanations and defense has brought; 
attention was again obtained on behalf of nuclear power. And as Knut Halvor Alfsen of 
Cicero says, when weighing up pros and cons of different technological choices one has to 
pick the lesser evil. “Perhaps in the time to come one will see a more rational debate around 
the advantages and disadvantages nuclear power in general. Thorium‟s potential lessening of 
some of the dilemmas and problems around it could be an instrument leading to a new round 
regarding nuclear power and the pros and cons.” 
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5.3.5. c) Public Opinion 
The nature of the consensus-based Norwegian governments, in recent years predominantly 
figuring as coalitions of more than two parties, renders them all the more vulnerable to public 
opinion and loyalty to strong voter-factions.  
Fear of the unknown is a factor in the skepticism towards nuclear power. In Martin Bauer‟s 
Resistance to New Technology, the fear of three modern technologies is traced – information 
technology, nuclear power and biotechnology. What is highlighted is the intangibleness; how 
they have such far-reaching effects on our lives that cannot be directly seen, felt or heard. 
Sverre Hval endorses this view, “people fear nuclear power because in the case of an accident, 
however unlikely, the radiation is something they cannot smell, see, feel or hear.” Though 
there may be some residual fear from Chernobyl and other incidents, fears and doubts seem 
likely to be founded on a lack of knowledge and skepticism towards available information. 
The conducted survey on public opinion was small and thus not representative for a nation; it 
did, however, provide interesting indications. Those in favor of nuclear power in Norway 
were not predominantly from the younger generation, rather a comparative majority of those 
who are old enough to entertain vivid memories of Chernobyl reported being positive whereas 
many of the younger participants revealed doubt. Perhaps speculative, but it may be due to a 
longer life ahead of them and accordingly other concerns. A general result spanning age, 
gender and occupation was that a majority found the available quantity of information 
insufficient to feel adequately informed when making a decision. A majority also reported 
lack of trust in the information they could find. When asked who they would trust to provide 
reliable information “scientists” (specified: without an agenda) were top of the list, with 
“politicians” at the bottom.  This weak spot could be mended by getting reliable information 
out in larger amounts – better information might on its own spur more people to take a stand, 
also in favor. Those who fear it for being unknown and not receiving information to “cure” 
this will likely remain undecided or opposed until convinced otherwise. Most reported being 
open to good arguments from all sources – economists, scientists, environmentalists and 
politicians. When asked about what justification (on behalf of nuclear power) they considered 
sound, climate changes were not the one and only factor that stood out. Of practically equal 
importance were energy demand and economic considerations. These three together might 
provide a base for arguments in favor. Most that reported being in favor of thorium-based 
nuclear power were in favor of nuclear power in general. Interestingly enough, there was still 
a notable number replying that they were positive to thorium-based nuclear power while being 
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negative towards conventional nuclear power. These have perhaps been enticed by the recent 
thorium-optimism. With very few exceptions, all reported being in favor of intensified 
research in the field in relation to thorium. The research aspect could as such be highlighted in 
discussions, both in relation to the importance of maintaining a knowledge base and in 
relation to business opportunities.  
5.3.5. d) Environmental organizations 
Environmental organizations have affected or caused bottlenecks and blocks to decisions 
before. As one interviewee puts it, “the government is afraid of them.” They have traditionally 
had a strong-hold through their ability to mobilize public support for a cause, such as a new 
campaign against nuclear power would be. In the case that it is doable, their support would 
have to be won through accurate information about waste handling methods and security 
accompanied by convincing arguments of why this is the best option under the prevailing 
situation. Professor Samseth was optimistic to a new generation of environmentalists coming 
up through the organizations without vivid memories of nuclear bombs or the Chernobyl 
accident, susceptible to persuasion of the improved nuclear technology and its useful role. 
When I spoke with representatives from some of the well-known environmental organizations 
in Norway, this was not the impression I got.  Natur og Ungdom (NU - Nature and Youth) is 
for youths especially and is ardently opposed to any form of nuclear power. Lundberg of NU 
affirmed they had signed an appeal against thorium and nuclear power. The appeal was signed 
by all the noteworthy environmental organizations in the country, giving a good inkling of 
their stance. The technologically optimistic ZERO produced its own thorium report and its 
author – Erik Martiniussen – states that they are not opposed to any technology per se. He 
says further that they are, of course, aware that it is not an alternative for all existing facilities 
elsewhere to just shut down. The reason for opposing nuclear power in Norway is – in their 
view – an insufficient need for it here, and thus the benefits of pursuing other wholly 
renewable and environmentally friendly options. They note also with concern that the spread 
of such a potentially harmful technology can lead to no good; it escalates the possibility of the 
wrong hands reaching into any part of the process. The strength of the environmental faction 
lies in being able to affect political attitudes in the phases preceding and leading up to 
decisions. There are, however, few tools that they can employ once political consensus is 
reached on a matter. Civil disobedience has some, but limited, scope. In the words of one of 
my pro-interviewees: “In my opinion the government should trump this through and let the 
environmentalists squeal and bawl for a while.” 
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5.3.5. e) The Coalition 
Though perhaps wisely worded differently in the public sphere the sentiment above seems 
spot on regarding  possibilities of success for the advocacy coalition. The sitting government 
has yet to show any dedication to the cause. Comments so far have revealed skepticism 
towards introduction of nuclear power for commercial energy production also among the 
opposition parties, with the notable exception of the Progress Party.  Enlisting a larger group 
like the industry to be an active part of the coalition rather than a passive support might 
become a help in swaying the government. In the existing advocacy coalition a big push 
comes from Thor Energy and its allies. As to the question of whether thorium will make it to 
market in Norway, and whether there will be a successful build-up of a TIS around it, it is 
somewhat uncertain that their interest in it is great enough. Looking to bring a new 
technology to market in Norway they have nevertheless admitted not to be crusaders for the 
nuclear cause. That is not what their company is about. It is, nonetheless, presently a 
substantial actor and a catalyst for keeping the issue warm. Academia is party to the coalition 
and there are good channels and networks of knowledge diffusion and cooperation. Good 
alliances and links are up and running; between various institutions of academia and between 
academia and business and indeed among businesses themselves. These could – and should – 
nonetheless be strengthened further. Another budding connection of interest is between the 
more practical orientations of for example NTNU, and other academic institutions. It appears 
that two groupings have arisen, aware of each other and linked indirectly in one way or 
another through the new and the old hubs – Thor Energy/Statkraft and IFE; the first being 
new and prodding for knowledge wherever retrievable and the latter being the old heavy-
weight one cannot get past in the field in Norway. Having slightly different fortes should 
inspire a further “joining of forces” rather than chasing down two related paths. The pooling 
of all knowledge, skill as well as momentum could only aid the cause. Bringing together all 
with an interest in the field under the same umbrella – if possible – and engaging in a 
concerted effort towards a clearly pronounced aim seems like it would assist a cause so 
disputed.  
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6. Concluding remarks 
I came to this case as an outsider, systematically trying to tie up loose ends and see a full 
picture. Throughout the analysis‟ second part there are some overlaps under the different 
functions. They were nonetheless set up this way; to demarcate subtle areas and give more 
lucidity to detail. As I was finishing up my thesis I received some helpful emails from a 
couple of my contacts. I was informed about the work towards an application for funds for a 
research center for environmentally friendly nuclear power. Briefly mentioned under the 
second and third function of TIS in the analysis, it is a cooperative effort between IFE, UiO, 
UiB and NTNU along with some industrial partners (not specified). The outcome is not yet 
confirmed. Should it be successful, however, one would be looking at a substantial budget for 
a period of seven years. This is linked to the concerns I presented on behalf of the case; wider 
enlisting of the industry and cross-spectrum associations and continuous strengthening of 
these. It is a promising development.  
Areas of further study regarding the potential of thorium-based energy in Norway should 
include a wider and more detailed survey of public opinion. Some valuable indications could 
be drawn from the survey conducted here; but in order to be statistically helpful a 
significantly larger number of participants recruited through a meticulous selection process 
need to be enrolled, along with more detailed questions. It appears thorium might have 
opened for new thoughts and attitudes; many remain sceptical however and there is still a job 
to be done in order to ensure public support for the cause of nuclear power in any way, shape 
or form. Learning from “round one”, the negative opinion of the public seems roused when 
location questions arise – no one wants the reactor in their neighbourhood and this challenge 
must be tackled astutely. A larger and more reliable amount of information is also called for 
in order to secure public support.  
Of other findings the push from industry is necessary in order to advance the case of thorium. 
It is as such promising that some from the industry are now getting on board with things like 
the mentioned research center. It was unclear how many and how strong, and the industry in 
general have not been vocal enough to manage a definitive push as of yet. Declarations in 
media, as well the initiative above, indicate interest is there in the industrial segment in 
Norway. Though presently not a strong enough force in its own right it could become an 
important part of the push in a domino effect if this gets going. Tied to this is business 
interest. So far the Norwegian business community has not shown the required amount of 
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interest to be a shaping factor. Business needs to come on board but this again is linked to 
attitudes of authorities, who also need to be recruited as adherents. A pull from the 
international arena as well as changing considerations regarding climate and oil combined 
with industry/business interests might gradually shift attitudes; in the immediate future it does 
not seem likely that thorium or any other form of nuclear power will be of great focus in 
Norway.  
Throughout the thesis the use of the terms nuclear power and thorium have been intermingled 
to a large extent – this because they are two sides of the same thing and thorium cannot be 
considered as a separate issue from nuclear power. As thorium was the focus of this thesis it is 
nonetheless in its place to separate them now in the conclusion. The question is – what 
potential does thorium have in Norway and what are the obstacles. The obstacles have been 
discussed and are largely the same as for conventional nuclear power; those that would be 
unique to thorium could be technical (which has not been the focus in this thesis), and related 
to delivering what is promised in terms of being safer and producing less/shorter-lived waste 
in order to maintain what public support comes its way. An issue discussed in the analysis 
was the research/general interest in nuclear power versus business interest and specific focus 
on thorium. Though these are all interlinked, appear “on the same side” and in favour of each 
others‟ causes; when sifting the case and being left with what is chiefly and directly thorium-
centred the dimensions are small. I feel the thesis has been successful in uncovering a clearer 
version of the whole picture. At the core there are people, initiatives and efforts of and 
substance. The scope of thorium in Norway was smaller than it first appeared through media 
coverage, and the prospects not as great. When in the wake of the Thorium Report being 
published it was shot down and presented as a “dead case” this too was inaccurate; it is still a 
topic of substance and deserving of attention. That thorium might make it to the market in a 
foreseeable future is not unlikely, should the adequate amount of funding be there. It is not 
positioned to take a dominating role on the international arena at this point. Other 
technologies will do that. A general shift in attitude towards nuclear power, which appears to 
be in process, will affect thorium too. Accept of nuclear power will be accept of thorium, and 
the choice will depend on best fit of technology and resource accessibility. Some countries, 
like India, have a focus on thorium. In a near future thorium will, as mentioned, not be the 
dominating source of energy internationally. For a more distant future it is risky to predict. 
Though an international pull in the direction of widespread thorium-based nuclear power 
production is absent, a general pull for nuclear power could serve the same purpose of 
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encouragement. If linked to thorium‟s beneficial aspects – which were the basis of its 
attention and the more sympathetic attitudes towards it in Norway – this could be the ticket to 
getting it endorsed by the Norwegian public and authorities. There are still a lot of “what ifs” 
but these could be turned to opportunities rather than obstacles. The potential market entry 
through Thor Energy‟s plans is definitely a possibility, but does not mean a power plant will 
be built on Norwegian soil. Getting to that will be a process demanding time and concerted 
effort. Following Thor Energy‟s plans this will be a conventional though advanced reactor, 
and not with the use of the Norwegian thorium reserves. If a general mutual interest in nuclear 
power and related knowledge can coalesce and “forces” be joined even where it means 
fighting for things on the side of one‟s main interest, then a more effective advocacy coalition 
could make use of the argument that one must act now in order to preserve vital knowledge on 
the subject in Norway to press for a green light for thorium-based nuclear power.  
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